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ABSTRACT 
 
Human capital production is central to economic wellbeing from a national 
perspective: it improves productivity, spurs technological innovation, and promotes 
sustainable economic growth over time.  Equally important, investments in human capital 
are central to economic wellbeing at the individual level.  College graduates tend to earn 
more money, are more employable, are better able to manage economic downturns, and 
have even been shown to have better health.  Moreover, for many students, the college 
experience is an important lesson in living independently, developing social and 
professional networks, and generally taking on more responsibility in one’s life.  It has 
been said that pursuing a degree in higher education is the largest investment one can 
make for the future.  This work employs a variety of empirical strategies to better 
understand how students make choices regarding college: where to attend, what to study, 
and whether to work during college or not, for example. 
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Chapter 1 provides background on two contentious issues in American higher 
education: the changing structure of financial aid and the longstanding trend of 
lengthening time to baccalaureate degree in the United States.  Traditional financial aid 
has included subsidized and non-subsidized loans, need-based financial aid (e.g., Federal 
Pell Grant Program), and targeted merit-based financial aid, such as academic or athletic 
scholarships.  However, the early 1990s saw the advent of a new type of financial aid: 
broad-based, state merit-based aid scholarships.  I provide background information on 
how such scholarships are generally structured, paying special attention to New Mexico’s 
program, the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS).  Chapter 1 then 
discusses longstanding trends in the time it takes undergraduate students to earn 
bachelor’s degrees in the United States.  Focus is targeted at the potential costs of this 
phenomenon to state budgets, institutions, and the students themselves.  Chapter 1 
concludes by discussing responses to this trend by lawmakers and higher education 
officials, and whether such responses are warranted. 
Using a rich administrative data set from New Mexico’s flagship university, 
Chapter 2 examines whether the NMLLS resulted in any meaningful change in 4-, 5-, and 
6-year completion rates comparing qualified resident students to nonqualified nonresident 
students before and after the program became effective.  Propensity score matching is 
performed to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresidents.  We 
find no overall completion effects in the aggregate, but do find economically meaningful 
divergent completion effects by academic preparation.  It appears that results may be 
driven by students from families whose financial constraints are binding. 
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Chapter three investigates whether college graduates suffer a wage penalty in the 
labor market for taking longer than traditional standards to complete an undergraduate 
degree.  We view this as a test of whether employers view time to degree as a 
productivity signal in the labor market.  According to human capital theory, there should 
be no wage penalty if students are accumulating the same amount of credits at a slower 
rate.  However, if employers view lengthened time to degree as a negative productivity 
signal, then one would expect a wage penalty.  Previous literature has found large and 
statistically significant wage penalties associated with lengthened time to degree, but we 
are not convinced they have adequately addressed the endogeneity of time to degree in 
the student wage equation.  When we address endogeneity by controlling for institutional 
quality, student ability, and instrumenting for the student’s own time to degree with the 
average time to degree at their institution, we find no evidence that employers view 
lengthened time to degree as a negative productivity signal. 
Chapter 4 uses the same data set and methods as Chapter 2, but examines 
students’ choice of majors.  I argue that one potential unintended consequence of broad-
based merit scholarships is to discourage students from attempting more difficult majors, 
such as STEM, in order to maximize the likelihood of scholarship retaining.  This may be 
particularly true for marginally academically prepared students.  I find no evidence that 
either the likelihood of first majoring in a STEM field or earning a degree in STEM is 
affected in the aggregate by the enactment of the NMLLS.  Statistically significant effects 
emerge when disaggregating by academic preparation, however—academically less 
prepared students are less likely to pursue a STEM major as a result of the NMLLS, 
while more academically prepared students are more likely to first major in a STEM 
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field.  This is in accordance with the previous literature as well as the theoretical model 
offered in the paper. 
Chapter 5 concludes, with a summary of main results from Chapters 2 through 4, 
with special attention being paid to the policy implication of these findings.  Chapter 5 
also offers suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction: Merit aid, student decisions, and employer responses 
 
This work focuses on two major issues which have garnered significant attention 
in higher education over the previous two decades.  The first is the changing structure of 
financial aid in the United States.  Traditionally, students have either financed higher 
education out of their own pockets (or their parents’ pockets) or through loans, need-
based financial aid, or academic or athletic scholarships.  Since the early 1990s, however, 
a new type of funding mechanism has been popularized: state merit aid scholarships.  
Such scholarships tend to be very generous in that they generally cover all or nearly all of 
a qualifying students direct college costs.  State merit aid scholarships are broad in the 
sense that they are generally available to all in-state resident students meeting some sort 
of academic criteria.  Many of these scholarship are at least partially funded by proceeds 
from state lottery ticket sales.  Such scholarships are meant to increase access to higher 
education for students from families that would otherwise not be able to afford college, or 
may not be motivated to finish high school since they otherwise assume they would not 
be able to afford college afterwards. 
Currently, at least 27 states have some form of merit aid scholarship, each with 
varying initial and renewal requirements.  As an example of a broad-based, generous 
state merit aid scholarship, consider the first and most studied scholarship of its kind, 
Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally scholarship, or HOPE.  The 
program was launched in 1993 and provides full tuition and fees to qualifying students.  
Initial qualifications include being a state resident of Georgia and graduating from high 
school with a minimum 3.0 cumulative grade point average (GPA).  Renewal of the 
scholarship requires maintaining a cumulative 3.0 GPA in college, and students may 
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continue to receive the award for up to seven years, until they attempt 127 credit hours, or 
complete a bachelor’s degree—whichever comes first.  As of 2010, approximately 43 
percent of all undergraduates in the University of Georgia System were receiving HOPE 
(Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a).  Despite the popularization of state merit aid scholarships 
such as HOPE, many questions remain regarding possible unintended consequences of 
generous financial aid tied to modest academic requirements. 
The second major phenomenon that has garnered significant attention from 
university officials, lawmakers, and even state and federal governments is lengthening 
time to baccalaureate degree in the United States.  Since the 1970s, the time it takes a 
student to complete a bachelor’s degree has steadily risen.  For example, 58 percent 
college graduates from the 1972 high school class graduated in four years or less; this 
figure dropped to 44 percent for the 1992 high school class (Bound and Turner, 2010).  
More recent data suggest this trend has continued.  This has caused alarm for several 
reasons, including the straining of resources at universities, inefficient spending of state 
and federal appropriations, and suboptimal labor market outcomes for students taking 
longer than the traditional four years to complete their undergraduate studies.  Recently, 
states have been taking matters into their own hands by proposing punishments for those 
that do not remain on-track to graduate within four years.  In 2012 alone, five state 
legislatures passed laws aimed at reducing time to degree.  In the wake of all the attention 
paid to baccalaureate time to degree by policymakers, it is worth asking whether all of the 
concern is justified. 
Chapter 2 focuses on New Mexico’s state merit aid scholarship, the New Mexico 
Legislative Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS).  The NMLLS is unique in that it has the 
  3 
lowest academic requirements of any state merit aid scholarship.  To qualify, one only 
needs to be a state resident, graduate from a New Mexico high school, and immediately 
enroll in any one of 16 qualified in-state institutions.  In-state institutions then 
automatically award a “Bridge to Success Scholarship” that pays all tuition and fees in 
the student’s first semester.  If the student earns a minimum 2.5 GPA and completes at 
least 12 credit hours in this first semester, they are then eligible for the NMLLS.  The 
NMLLS pays full tuition and fees for up to four additional years beyond the “bridging” 
semester as long as students maintain a cumulative 2.5 GPA and complete at least 12 
credit hours per semester.  Beyond its low academic requirements, the NMLLS is also 
unique in that it is the only state merit aid scholarship where initial eligibility 
requirements are based on college—not high school—performance. 
Using a rich administrative data set that covers the population of students over a 
ten-year period, we examine how this “low-bar” state merit aid scholarship promotes 
graduation.  This is an empirical question from the outset: one would expect that relaxing 
financial constraints for students, perhaps even affording them the opportunity to not 
have to work during college and spend more time studying, would result in higher 
graduation rates.  However, low-bar nature of initial and renewal eligibility requirements 
may incentivize some students to attend a college they otherwise would not have without 
the scholarship.  If the scholarship results in an influx of marginally academically 
prepared students, then perhaps graduation rates would suffer.  I attempt to answer this 
question by using a sophisticated difference-in-differences matching estimator using 
qualified resident students as the treatment group and nonresident (and therefore 
nonqualified) students as the control group.  Propensity score matching is performed to 
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mitigate any observable differences between residents and nonresidents, and the success 
of the matching algorithm is examined using recent statistical diagnostic tests developed 
by Imbens and Rubin (2015).  I also examine the feasibility of using regression 
discontinuity design to examine the relationship between merit aid and college 
completion, which itself is an implicit test of whether students are able to strategically 
“game” NMLLS eligibility requirements.  Although results suggest no overall completion 
effects resulting from the NMLLS, meaningful divergent effects appear when 
disaggregating the sample by academic preparation—more academically prepared 
students exhibited positive completion effects while less academically prepared students 
exhibited negative completion effects. 
Chapter 3 revisits previous literature to examine the latest trends in increasing 
time to baccalaureate degree in the United States.  Using a restricted nationally-
representative longitudinal study from the Department of Education, we ask whether 
students that overshoot the traditional four-year graduation mark are penalized in the 
labor market.  Another way of looking at this research question is: does baccalaureate 
time to degree serve as a productivity signal in the United States?  From one perspective, 
human capital theory predicts that time to degree should not matter if students are 
acquiring the same amount of human capital over a longer period of time (assuming 
human capital does not depreciate).  From another perspective, employers may view 
lengthier time to degree as a negative productivity signal.  If so, and assuming wages 
reflect productivity, there would be a wage penalty associated with longer time to degree.  
Testing for this is not straightforward, and the previous literature is not able to overcome 
endogeneity issues.  Because variables such as student ability1 and school quality are 
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correlated with both time to degree and future earnings, this is an identification problem 
that needs to be addressed.  I address this endogeneity problem using instrumental 
variables techniques and provide an update to previous literature on this subject.  We find 
that we are able to replicate wage penalties found in previous studies which appeal to 
ordinary least squares, but instrumental variables reveals no such wage penalties for 
lengthened time to degree.  These results suggest that previous studies of the relationship 
between time to degree and wages suffer from significant bias. 
Chapter 4 revisits the NMLLS with another question about unintended 
consequences.  Merit aid tied to academic requirements, in general, may result in the 
perverse outcome of students pursuing easier courses of study in order to maximize their 
chances of scholarship retention.  Given the nation’s preoccupation with promoting 
degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), I ask whether the 
NMLLS dissuades scholarship recipients from pursuing majors in STEM and whether the 
scholarship results in lower STEM degree production.  Previous literature on the subject 
finds either null or negative effects of state merit aid on STEM degree production 
(Cornwell et al., 2006; Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a).  Since the matching algorithm from 
Chapter 2 does not consider any outcomes—only covariates—and is considered 
successful, we appeal to the same difference-in-differences matching estimator and 
diagnostic testing procedures.  The main contribution of this chapter is that we use a rich 
administrative data that allows for a much more detailed analysis relative to previous 
literature. In particular, we test for major choice effects in the aggregate, but also 
disaggregate by academic preparation, something not attempted in previous studies.  
Results reveal no effect of the NMLLS on either first majoring in a STEM field or 
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eventually earning a STEM degree, however divergent effects are again found by 
academic preparation—less academically prepared students are less likely to first declare 
a major in STEM, while more academically prepared students are more likely to do so. 
In Chapter 5, main conclusions and policy implications are revisited and extended 
discussion is provided.  Particular attention will be paid to the scientific contributions 
from each chapter, and how these contributions fit into the broader field of the economics 
of education.  This chapter also discusses policy implications and methodological 
limitations, and concludes by offering direction for future research in the above areas. 
The main argument in this dissertation is that unintended consequences may occur 
when we design policies in higher education to broadly subsidize students or to restrict 
their behavior.  Giving generous amounts of merit aid to students that are perhaps 
marginally qualified for postsecondary studies may result in the unintended consequence 
of promoting overmatching in higher education, which sets up some students for failure.  
Such programs also have the consequence of changing students’ choice of major, and 
therefore ultimately their career paths.  Although the intentions are well-placed, the 
outcomes are sometimes suboptimal.  This is true of proposals to punish students that 
wish to take a nontraditional path to a baccalaureate degree.  Students are rational actors 
in the economy, and spending time and money legislating their college choices is an 
inefficient allocation of resources.  Sometimes the best remedy is no remedy at all. 
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Notes 
1 We use the term “ability” not to describe the innate characteristics of the student, 
but to instead describe a constructed measure, such as academic preparation, for example.  
As such, it is not intended to provide negative connotation for any students included in 
the sample.   
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Chapter 2: Does broad-based merit aid improve college completion? Evidence 
from New Mexico's lottery scholarship 
 We use the natural experiment of a state lottery scholarship to measure the effect of 
generous financial aid on graduation rates at New Mexico’s flagship public university.  
During the study period, the scholarship program paid full tuition for eight semesters for 
any state resident earning a 2.5 GPA in their first semester at any public 2-year or 4-year 
college.  We find a significant positive completion effect of 9.4 percentage points (16.8 
percent) for academically well-prepared students that is offset by a nearly equal and 
opposite negative effect for less prepared students.  We posit that the scholarship 
program, which effectively erased the difference in tuition at 2- and 4-year colleges, may 
have induced weaker students to take their chances on a more prestigious, yet riskier, 
academic path. 
2.1 Introduction 
 The introduction of broad, merit-based college scholarships in the 1990s created a 
natural experiment for measuring relationships between college costs and academic 
outcomes.  State merit-based scholarships generally fund most if not all tuition for 
qualified resident students.  State legislation establishing merit-based scholarships share 
several common goals: retaining talent in-state, increasing access to higher education by 
reducing financial burdens, and promoting timely completion.  There is considerable 
variation in initial and continuing eligibility requirements across states.  Researchers have 
cataloged how such programs affect enrollment and course taking behavior, and, more 
recently, degree completion.  We analyze the effect of the New Mexico Legislative 
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Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS), a uniquely “low-bar” merit-based scholarship, on degree 
completion. 
 Since the 1993, at least 25 states have implemented merit-based scholarships, the 
first and most studied being Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally, or 
HOPE, scholarship program.2   HOPE marked the beginning of what has been a major 
restructuring of the financial aid landscape in America.  According to the College Board, 
from 1993 to 2013, the percentage of total undergraduate state grant aid for which 
students’ financial circumstances were considered decreased from 90 percent to 76 
percent.  In the 2013-2014 academic year, New Mexico was one of 13 states where this 
percentage was below 40 percent.3 
 We know more about the relationship between financial aid and enrollment than 
financial aid and college completion.  Different types of financial aid have varying effects 
on college enrollment.  Loans tend to have little to no effect, while grants have a positive 
and significant effect on student enrollment (Linsenmeier et al. 2006).  Students from 
low-income families and students of color seem to be most responsive to such aid.  Van 
der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates that students’ choice of college are sensitive to financial 
aid offers.  Several studies show a significant and positive relationship between grant aid 
and student enrollment (Seftor and Turner, 2002; Kane, 2003; Heller, 2009) and a 
negative relationship between net cost and enrollment (McPherson and Schapiro 1991).  
The effects of merit-based aid on enrollment have also been well documented.  In an 
experimental setting, Monks (2009) finds large, positive effects of merit aid on 
enrollment.  Studying HOPE, Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000 award increased 
student enrollment by approximately four percent.  Also studying HOPE, Cornwell et al. 
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(2006) find the program increased student enrollment by 6 percent.  In New Mexico, 
Binder and Ganderton (2002, 2004) find that while the NMLLS boosted enrollment at 
four-year colleges in New Mexico, the effect appears to be driven by additional 
enrollment of students that otherwise would have attended college out-of-state. 
 The NMLLS was specifically designed to increase access to higher education and 
encourage students to finish high school.  The bill’s sponsor, Senator Michael Sanchez, 
discussed the impetus for the program, noting: 
…when I went to high school, I saw a lot of my friends, a lot of other 
individuals, who had to drop out of school to either go on to the service to 
help provide for their families or work on family farms or get some kind of 
job to help their families out in this area. 
…we just thought that, what is an incentive to try to keep people in school? … 
Talking to different people … it was always a matter of well, ‘why should we 
finish high school because even if we graduate from high school, we’re not 
going to be able to afford to go to college.’ (Ness 2008, pp. 36) 
 
 While making higher education widely accessible is certainly a noble objective, 
effective merit-based aid programs should also increase degree completion. Although 
there is likely a positive productivity signal sent by those whose highest level of 
education is “some college, no degree,” research suggests that the returns to such 
attainment are far exceeded by earning a bachelor’s degree (Arrow, 1973; Jaeger and 
Page, 1996).  Degree completion is associated with better health, increased earnings, and 
overall happiness (Card, 1999; Cuñado and de Gracia, 2012; Schafer et al., 2013). 
We examine how the NMLLS affects college completion at the University of 
New Mexico (UNM) by exploring changes in completion rates before and after the 
implementation of the scholarship for eligible resident students and a matched sample of 
nonresident (and therefore ineligible) students.  Estimates reveal no significant overall 
effect of the program on completion rates.  However, we do find large and statistically 
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significant completion effects after disaggregating by high school performance.  
Academically well-prepared eligible freshmen are 9.4 percentage points (16.8 percent) 
more likely to graduate within six years, compared to ineligible peers with similar high 
school GPAs.  Less academically-prepared freshmen are approximately 8.7 percentage 
points (27.5 percent) less likely than their ineligible peers to graduate within six years.  
These opposite responses dampen the overall effect of the NMLLS. Further 
decomposition by family income suggests that low-income students likely drive this 
pattern. 
Findings are informative to states with existing broad-based merit scholarships 
and those contemplating launching programs of their own.  Because the NMLLS covers 
all tuition over our sample period4 for many high school graduates, effectively removing 
price differentials between universities, our research also informs recent proposals to 
make college “free” for students with family incomes under $125,000.5  Our results 
support the idea that removing price as a signal in higher education markets may skew 
students’ college-going decisions, resulting in increased “overmatching” (see 
Arcidiacono et al., 2016, for example).   
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses existing literature regarding 
merit-aid and college completion, and introduces the NMLLS; Section 2.3 presents a 
theoretical model of college persistence; Section 2.4 describes the data; Section 2.5 
summarizes the empirical approach; Section 2.6 discusses main findings and robustness 
checks; Section 2.7 discusses other explanations for patterns we find in the results; and 
Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2 Financial aid and student outcomes 
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The natural experiment of lottery-financed merit-based aid programs provides a 
promising avenue for determining the relationship between aid and college completion.  
Analyzing statewide educational attainment data, Sjoquist and Winters (2012, 2015b) 
found no difference in college attainment for those exposed to lottery scholarship 
programs. Using a similar methodology, Jia (2017) found that program features matter: 
lower initial scholarship eligibility requirements increased two-year degree attainment, 
and funding generosity increased the completion of a bachelor’s degree. 
Scott-Clayton (2011) found completion effects of 9.4 percentage points (59 
percent) for students just above an ACT cut-off for West Virginia’s lottery-funded 
PROMISE scholarship program, compared to students just below.  Using similar 
strategies, Bruce and Carruthers (2014) and Welch (2014) found no program effect for 
Tennessee’s lottery scholarship.  The discrepancy between these studies may arise from 
differences in student characteristics.  Because of differences in program requirements, 
all students in Scott-Clayton’s sample have high school GPAs of 3.0 or higher while 
students in Bruce and Carruthers’ and Welch’s sample have high school GPAs below 
3.0.6  It may be that only stronger students are able to respond to merit requirements.  A 
high rate of scholarship loss supports this supposition.  For example, only 50 percent of 
students who initially earn the PROMISE scholarship retain it for four years of college.  
It also bears noting that Scott-Clayton’s large 9.4 percentage point (59 percent) point 
completion effect at four years declines to 4.5 percentage points (12 percent) at five 
years.  It is therefore possible that the scholarship program improves time to degree 
without changing eventual college completion.  This would explain why Sjoquist and 
Winters (2012, 2015b) find no population graduation effect.  
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Castleman and Long (2013) examine the effect of the need-based Florida Student 
Access Grant (FSAG), which awards $1,300 annual grants to students whose family’s EFC 
falls below an annually determined cutoff, with no additional academic restrictions for grant 
receipt in the first year.  Because the EFC is generated from information provided by students 
to the FAFSA according to an opaque algorithm, and because the cutoff is determined each 
year and is not publicized,7 it is unlikely that students manipulated their FAFSA responses to 
become eligible.  Students just above and just below this cutoff were therefore likely to have 
differed only by grant receipt, providing an opportunity to test the effect of need-based 
financial aid on college outcomes.  Castleman and Long find that students just below the 
cutoff for the FSAG in the 2000-2001 school year are 4.6 percentage points (22 percent) 
more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree in six years than those just above the cutoff.  In this 
case, the effect on graduation persists over time: it is 3.2 percentage points (20 percent) at 
five years and 5.2 percentage points (21 percent) at seven years, the longest period reported. 
At least one study implicates financial aid in worse college outcomes.  In their study 
of Massachusetts’ Adams Scholarship, a program providing 10th graders in the top quartile of 
a state standardized test with tuition waivers to attend public in-state colleges, Cohodes and 
Goodman (2014) find that award eligibility decreases the likelihood of obtaining a degree 
within six years by 2.5 percentage points (4 percent).  The mechanism for this perverse 
outcome appears to be the diversion of students from higher quality private to lower quality 
public institutions.  The authors conclude that students are willing to sacrifice significant 
college quality in response to scholarship receipt. 
Mixed evidence for lottery program effects may be a result of their broad base in 
terms of income (so that many recipients are not financially constrained) and relatively 
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narrow base in terms of merit (so that many recipients are likely to succeed in college 
anyway).  We are therefore particularly interested in the effect of NMLLS on lower income 
and higher ability students, the group that saw the greatest benefit from the FSAG program. 
2.2.1 NMLLS program details   
The NMLLS, established by the New Mexico Legislature in 1996, first became 
available to students in fall 1997.  New Mexico residents qualify for the NMLLS if they 
earn a high school diploma or general educational development (GED) equivalency in 
New Mexico and enroll at a public postsecondary institution in the first regular fall or 
spring semester following high school graduation.  Most state lottery scholarship 
programs reward high school achievement and begin with the first semester of college 
enrollment.  In New Mexico, however, students become eligible for full tuition at any of 
the 16 qualified public two- or four-year colleges after they complete a full-time course 
load (at least 12 credits) with a 2.5 GPA or higher in their first college semester.  To 
encourage students to try for the scholarship, New Mexico colleges offer students 
“Bridge to Success” scholarships which completely or mostly offset tuition in their first 
semester.  In the period examined, students could receive the award for up to eight 
semesters, provided they enroll full-time, continuously, and maintained a cumulative 2.5 
GPA.  Only 58 percent of first semester students over 1994-1999 met NMLLS 
requirements, and only 30 percent remained eligible at the end of their second year. 
Before the NMLLS, New Mexico nearly exclusively awarded financial aid based 
on need.  According to a 1994 National Association of State Student Grant & Aid 
Programs report, New Mexico devoted an average of $222 per full-time equivalent (FTE) 
undergraduate student in financial aid in the 1993-1994 academic year.  Of the $222 total 
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per FTE, only $3 (1.4 percent) was merit-based.  By contrast, in 2000, New Mexico 
allocated $687 per undergraduate FTE, with $368 (54 percent) being merit-based.  It 
appears the NMLLS not only supplemented rather than supplanted student aid, but 
drastically changed the student aid landscape throughout the state. 
Compared to states with similar programs, NMLLS eligibility requirements are 
relatively “low-bar.”  For example, Georgia’s HOPE scholarship requires students to 
graduate high school with a 3.0 cumulative GPA and maintain a 3.0 GPA in college.8  
Eligibility for Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship requires minimum ACT/SAT scores in 
addition to the 3.0 high school GPA requirement.  Renewal requires a 2.75 minimum 
overall GPA after attempting 24 and 48 credit hours, and requires a 3.0 minimum overall 
GPA at 72- and 96-credit hour reviews.9  Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship has three 
levels of merit-based awards, each with varying high school GPA, standardized test 
scores, and community service requirements.10 
If financial constraints are binding for students, then the NMLLS should have the 
desired effect of increasing the proportion of students meeting the 2.5 cumulative GPA 
and 12 credit hours continuous enrollment requirements, thus increasing completion 
rates.  But if other constraints, such as academic preparation are also binding, the 
scholarship could have the opposite effect, reducing completion rates for marginal 
students induced to enroll at the state’s flagship university who otherwise would have 
enrolled at a less prestigious university, a two-year program at a community college, or 
perhaps not have enrolled in college at all.  With price signals in the market for higher 
education removed, some students may choose to embark on a more prestigious, yet 
riskier, academic path—one that maximizes the “worth” of the scholarship (i.e., that 
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which covers the largest cost).  Consider full-time tuition at all 16 participating public 
institutions in New Mexico as depicted in Table 2.1.  A student better matched at Santa 
Fe Community College may decide to attend UNM instead simply because the 
scholarship covers more costs, the degree carries more prestige, and thus the NMLLS is 
“worth” more at the state’s flagship university. 
2.3 Merit aid and college persistence 
We model students’ college persistence behavior (and ultimately their decision to 
graduate) using a multistage investment model adapted from Bettinger (2004).  Students 
decide to enroll in college if they perceive in the initial period that the discounted stream 
of future benefits exceeds the expected discounted value of college costs.  Benefits are 
based on the earnings differential between those with college and high school degrees, 
𝐸଴ ቎ ෍ 𝛿௧ିଵ
்∗
௧ୀ்்஽ାଵ
(𝑤௖௢௟௟ − 𝑤௛௦)቏,          (1) 
where E0 is a student’s expectation before beginning school (t = 0), 𝛿 ≡
ଵ
ଵା௥
 is the 
student’s discount factor, r is the discount rate, and students expect to work for 𝑇∗ years 
following graduation.   TTD is the expected number of years it takes to earn a degree, 
with students beginning work in the following period.  College graduates earn wcoll and 
high school graduates earn whs.  The cost of college is: 
𝐸଴ ൥෍ 𝛿௧ିଵ
்்஽
௧ୀଵ
ቄ𝑤௛௦𝑇௦೔೟ + 𝛾𝐹௧ − 𝐴௜௧ ቀ𝑒௜௧൫𝑎௜,௧ିଵ, 𝑇௦೔೟൯ቁቅ൩,    (2) 
where Ts,it is the fraction of time student i dedicates to studying or attending class of the 
total time available for working or studying in time t; this fraction, multiplied by the high 
school graduate’s earnings, represents the opportunity cost of attending college.  Ft is 
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tuition and fees in time t, where the parameter 𝛾 is the proportion of tuition and fees the 
student is responsible for, as college attendance is commonly covered by one’s parents.  
Ait is non-loan financial aid available to student i in time t.  At least some of the available 
aid is merit-based, and so Ait is increasing in student effort per quality credit (credit times 
the four point GPA) earned, eit , which in turn is increasing in academic skill acquired in 
the previous period, ai, t-1 , and the time dedicated to studying, Ts,it .   
 Before enrolling, the student has some idea of how to divide time between 
studying and work, as well as how much effort is needed to maintain the offered financial 
aid package.  Upon enrolling, students expect the benefits of earning a degree outweigh 
the costs.  Once enrolled, however, they may discover they overestimated their academic 
preparation, underestimated the effort required to earn college credits, or both.  As a 
result, more time devoted to school may be needed, which raises opportunity cost, or may 
result in lower grades than expected, thereby resulting in higher direct costs because 
merit aid is rescinded.  In either scenario, costs have risen, and are now more likely to 
exceed the benefits of continuing in college.   
 The model predicts countervailing effects of broadly available merit aid on degree 
receipt.  Because the scholarship reduces the cost of attendance, more students will attend 
and complete college.  Simultaneously, students who are induced to attend college due to 
lower cost may overestimate their ability and underestimate the effort required to earn the 
NMLLS, so may be more likely to drop out.  Academic preparation is central to 
understanding how students respond to such financial aid.  As the NMLLS effectively 
removes price signals across public in-state institutions, students may seek to maximize 
the value of the scholarship by pursuing a degree from an institution which they feel 
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carries the most value—typically a more expensive or reputable institution.  This may 
result in some students overmatching (e.g., attending a school for which they are 
academically underprepared), leading to higher attrition rates for these students. 
To provide an incentive to graduate in a timely manner, the NMLLS was 
available to students for only eight semesters following the bridging semester.  However, 
the scholarship also only required a 12 credit-hour load for a student to be considered 
full-time.  Thus the incentive to graduate in nine semesters was countered by the 
incentive to maintain a 2.5 GPA, which would be harder to do with a higher credit load.  
Students thus face a tradeoff between losing the scholarship if they fail to meet the 
renewal requirements, and facing higher direct and opportunity costs at the end of their 
programs if they take longer than nine semesters to graduate.  If the opportunity cost, 
including the risk of losing the scholarship, of a 15 credit per semester course load that 
would produce a degree in nine semesters exceeds the cost of the 20 or so credits not 
covered by the scholarship, and the added opportunity cost of delayed full-time work, 
then the program may not effectively encourage timely completion.  Students whose 
families are funding their college education may not respond to the semester cap. 
2.4 Data set 
We use administrative data for all first-time, full-time entering freshmen at UNM 
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS to estimate completion effects.  UNM 
enrolls over 20,000 students each year in the City of Albuquerque, the largest 
metropolitan area of the state with over 500,000 residents.  UNM is nearly an open-
enrollment institution.  Our data include socio-demographic information (age, race, 
ethnicity, gender, family income, declined to state race-ethnicity), high school academic 
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performance (high school GPA, standardized test scores, indication of remedial 
coursework at UNM), and college academic performance by semester (credits earned, 
college GPA, date of graduation).  Data are complete with the exception of family 
income and high school GPA.  We only have family income for FAFSA-filing students, 
constituting 51 percent of students.  For those that did not submit a FAFSA, we assume 
that their family income is sufficiently high (i.e., ≥ $40,000) as to not qualify for the 
Federal Pell Grant Program.  This assumption is supported by the 1995-1996 Federal Pell 
Grant End-of-Year Report showing that less than two percent of Pell recipients had 
family income in excess of $40,000.11  This assumption is not perfect.  King (2004) 
estimates that in 2000 over ten percent of all Pell-eligible students did not fill out a 
FAFSA.12  If the analysis in King (2004) holds for our data set, then we would incur 
systematic measurement bias in the family income variable—some lower income 
students would be incorrectly placed in the higher income category.  Because we find 
evidence that low-income students drive the completion effects we detect, measurement 
error would likely only serve to dampen point estimates for low-income regressions.  We 
are missing high school GPA for home-schooled students, a small portion of 
matriculating students at UNM.  For these students, we assigned them the mean high 
school GPA of 3.28. 
We concentrate on the years 1994 to 1999, bounding the policy change by three 
years before and after implementation.  These years encompass the largest economic 
expansion in the U.S. since World War II.  During this period labor market conditions in 
New Mexico were gradually tightening but remained relatively stable, so we need not 
worry much that broad economic conditions are driving the results.  To our knowledge, 
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there were no concurrent policy changes at the high school or postsecondary level in New 
Mexico over the 1994-1999 period which would have differentially impacted enrollment 
and/or completion for residents and nonresidents.  As discussed below, having an equal 
number of years before and after the lottery scholarship is advantageous given our 
identification strategy.  As we show in Section 6, results are similar when we expand the 
sample period to include additional student cohorts.   
In our preferred specification, we compare recent high school graduates from 
New Mexico (who are NMLLS eligible) with those from out of state (who are not 
eligible, but who experience the same campus environment), while excluding foreign 
students. 
Table 2.2 compares summary statistics for resident and nonresident students 
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS.  It appears the composition of these 
groups changed across pre- and post-treatment periods.  In years before the 
implementation of the NMLLS, resident students had higher high school GPAs and ACT 
composite scores compared to years following the implementation of the NMLLS.  
Moreover, students matriculating after implementation were more likely to take remedial 
coursework at UNM.  These changes are statistically significant, suggesting that the 
NMLLS may have induced students with weaker academic preparation to enroll at UNM.  
Table 2.2 also shows that residents were less likely to come from lower-income families 
following implementation of the NMLLS, another indication of a compositional effect.  
The academic achievement of nonresident students improved following implementation 
of the NMLLS, according to HSGPA and composite ACT scores. 
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Although several statistically significant differences exist between resident and 
nonresident students in terms of high school GPA, composite ACT scores, remedial 
coursework, family income, race, and ethnicity, this does not threaten the validity of our 
difference-in-differences model of completion if the common trends assumption holds.  
The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that pre-treatment 
trends in the outcome variable be similar in trajectory across the treatment and control 
groups.  As a visual check of this identifying assumption, Figure 2.1 presents pre-
treatment trends in graduation rates for residents and nonresidents between 1994 and 
1999.  We are particularly interested in six-year graduation rate trends, a standard 
measure of completion.13  Visual inspection supports the validity of a difference-in-
differences identification strategy examining six-year graduation rates.  A more rigorous 
method of testing the common trends assumption is presented in Autor (2003).  
Following this strategy, we specify a flexible difference-in-differences model by 
interacting the resident dummy variable with cohort dummy variables, producing a model 
allowing for treatment at different time periods.  This model can be expressed as 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௦௧) = 𝛾௦ + 𝜆௧ + ∑ 𝛽௝
௤
௝ୀି௠ 𝐷௦௧(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) + 𝑋௜௦௧𝛿 + 𝜀௜௦௧  (3) 
where i denotes the student, s denotes residency status, and t denotes cohort year.  The 
variable Dst is the binary treatment indicator and k is the year which the treatment started 
(k = 1997 in our case).  Xist contains controls for race, ethnicity, gender, family income, 
remedial coursework in college, high school GPA, and standardized test scores.  Models 
report robust standard errors.  In equation (3), m and q are the number of leads and lags of 
the treatment effect included.  We include two leads and three lags in our test, defining 
1994 as the reference cohort. 
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Testing the common trends assumption using (3) requires examining whether 
𝛽௝ = 0 ∀𝑗 < 0. (4) 
 In other words, the common trends assumption holds when the coefficients on all 
leads of the treatment are zero.  This specification also has the advantage of informing 
whether estimated treatment effects occur in multiple post-treatment time periods, fade 
away with time, or remain constant, for example.  Tests are conducted for the four 
graduation outcomes using ordinary least squares and results are presented in Tables 2.3 
through 2.6.  Results provide evidence that the common trends assumption holds for all 
of our specifications, as estimated coefficients on all leads are not statistically different 
from zero. 
 Our data include 10,022 resident students, 6,307 of which enrolled during the 
post-NMLLS period and were eligible for the Bridge to Success Scholarship.  Of these, 
2,664 met cumulative GPA and credit attainment requirements to begin the NMLLS in 
their second semester.  Table 2.7 documents the number of students that maintain the 
scholarship in the second through ninth semester.  It is apparent scholarship loss was 
quite common.  Of the 2,664 students that qualified for the NMLLS, approximately 30 
percent were still eligible for the NMLLS going into their third year.   
2.5 Empirical model 
We conduct difference-in-differences matching estimation on the propensity score 
to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresident students.  
Chabé-Ferret (2015) conducts Monte Carlo simulations using experimental job training 
program data from LaLonde (1986), finding that difference-in-differences matching is 
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superior to simple difference-in-differences estimation (i.e., no matching) in replicating 
experimental results when the model is symmetric (i.e., there are an equal number of pre- 
and post-treatment periods) and matching is performed on time-invariant characteristics, 
two conditions our model satisfies.  Our approach uses kernel matching, a one-to-many 
matching technique that assigns larger weights to control units closer in propensity score.  
The general form of the matching estimator is given by 
∆஽஽ொ=
1
𝑛ଵ௧
෍ ቐ𝑌ଵ௧௜ − ෍ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌଴௧௝
௝∈ூబ೟∩ௌ೛
ቑ
௜∈ூభ೟∩ௌ೛
−
1
𝑛ଵ௧ᇲ
෍ ቐ𝑌ଵ௧ᇲ௜ − ෍ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌଴௧ᇲ௝
௝∈ூబ೟ᇲ∩ௌ೛
ቑ
௜∈ூభ೟ᇲ∩ௌ೛
          (5) 
where n1t, n1t’ are the number of treated cases before and after the inception of the 
NMLLS, Sp is the common support region, and I0t, I0t’, I1t, I1t’ are the resident and 
nonresident groups before and after the NMLLS.  Graduation rates for resident and 
nonresident students are given by Y1t, Y0t, Y1t’, Y0t’.  The function w(i, j) denotes the 
weight given to j𝑡ℎ case, where ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)௝  = 1 and 0 < 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1.  The weighting 
function w(i, j) is given by 
𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾ൣ𝑙መ൫𝑥௝൯ − 𝑙መ(𝑥௜)൧
∑ 𝐾ൣ𝑙መ൫𝑥௝൯ − 𝑙መ(𝑥௜)൧௝∈ூబ೟∩ௌ೛
          (6) 
where K is the Epanechnikov kernel function and 𝑙መ(⋅) ≡ ln ቀ ௣ො(⋅)
ଵି௣ො(⋅)
ቁ is the fitted linearized 
propensity score from a logistic regression model estimated by maximum likelihood.  We 
use linearized propensity scores as they are more likely to have a distribution that is 
approximately normal.  Treatment effects, ∆஽஽ொ, are calculated using kernel-weighted 
least squares according to equation (6).  Robust standard errors are reported.  The 
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propensity score model includes all covariates in levels, as well as several quadratic 
terms.14  Results of the propensity score model are presented in Table 2.8.  It is important 
to note that while the propensity score model may seem awkward in that it predicts the 
immutable condition of being a New Mexico resident, it is not essential that the 
propensity score model have a meaningful interpretation.  Instead, the validity of the 
propensity score model rests on how well it balances covariates across treatment and 
control groups (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Imbens, 2015). 
Having a small group of nonresident students relative to resident students has 
implications for our estimates.  In order to increase the precision of our estimated 
treatment effects, and to avoid imposing functional form where possible, we choose to 
conduct kernel density matching.15  This method has the advantage of lower variance 
since more information is used.  On the other hand, it may result in an increase in bias 
due to the potential for considering “bad” matches.  Although the further the observations 
are in terms of propensity score, the less weight is given to the potential bad match, this 
makes adequate overlap a necessary condition for the validity of this method. 
In our analysis, we limit matching to those individuals whose propensity scores 
lie in the common support region, which is over 99.5 percent of the original sample.  We 
do not  trim observations from the analysis.  As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate effects 
using various fixed bandwidths, h, for the kernel function.  Importantly, the choice of 
bandwidth also involves a bias-variance trade-off.  Smaller bandwidths consider a smaller 
portion of the pool of control observations, and thus use less information, which tends to 
reduce bias (from being less likely to consider poor matches) while increasing sampling 
variance.  In order to assess the effectiveness of the matching procedure, several tests are 
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conducted following Imbens and Rubin (2015), although they are modified for 
difference-in-differences matching with repeated cross sections.  An explanation of these 
tests and their results are presented in Appendix 2.A. 
A power analysis in Table 2.9 shows that most models we estimate have sufficient 
power to detect a five percent change in completion rates at the five percent significance-
level.  Models limiting the sample to students from low-income families are substantially 
underpowered, however.  The reader should thus exercise caution in interpreting results 
when the sample is limited in this way.  Models limited to less academically prepared 
students also fail to meet the accepted standard of 80 percent power.  Underpowered 
regressions are less likely to detect meaningful program effects, even if they do actually 
exist.  Evidence of low power is seen in results for students from low-income families—
there exist several coefficients large in magnitude that do not achieve statistical 
significance.  Although meaningful completion effects may exist in these cases, all we 
can conclude is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. 
 In addition to estimating the overall effect of the NMLLS, we are also interested 
in whether program effects differ depending on academic preparation.  We explore this 
possibility by estimating separate models on students above and below the mean high 
school GPA.16  We disaggregate further by family income in order to examine program 
effects for students whose financial constraints are more likely binding.  Robustness 
checks using varying cohorts and smoothing parameters are discussed in Section 2.6.  
Additionally, we estimate models of cumulative credits earned and time to degree to 
examine whether apparent completion effects are driven by changes in student course-
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taking behavior.  Lastly, we explore regression discontinuity design in estimating 
completion effects of the NMLLS. 
We note that while difference-in-differences models hinge on the comparability of 
pre-treatment trends in outcomes across residents and nonresidents, combining 
difference-in-differences methods with propensity score matching controls for 
compositional changes in groups over time (Stuart et al. 2014).  It is also worth noting 
that regressions control for high school achievement and standardized test scores, the 
main indication of compositional change.  Also, because UNM is a de facto open 
enrollment institution, changes in selectivity are not likely to confound the analysis 
(Binder and Ganderton, 2004).  We agree that compositional change occurred, but this 
does not threaten the validity of the treatment effects we find. 
2.6 Results 
 Means and normalized differences after kernel matching are presented in Table 
2.10.  Comparing means before and after the NMLLS, it appears that the matching 
algorithm performed well in balancing covariates.  Normalized differences for pre- and 
post-NMLLS periods are near zero, with the largest normalized difference (-.122) far 
below one-quarter of a standard deviation unit in absolute value.  We produce these 
statistics by academic preparation as well, finding a similar pattern, although differences 
were slightly higher when considering students more than one standard deviation above 
the mean high school GPA.  Overall, normalized differences suggest excellent balance in 
covariates following kernel matching. 
 Table 2.11 presents results of the difference-in-differences kernel matching 
estimation.  Note that we find little evidence of an overall program effect.  Point 
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estimates are near zero and do not approach statistical significance.  These estimates, 
however, mask large program responses that appear when we divide the sample by 
academic preparation.  Considering students with below average high school GPA, we 
find a negative completion effect for six-year graduation of 8.7 percentage points (27.5 
percent).  Students with above average high school GPA are 9.4 percentage points (16.8 
percent) more likely to graduate within six years compared to similar nonresident 
students.  Effects are significant at the five and ten percent-levels, respectively.  Thus, 
while we are certain of a negative completion effect for less academically prepared 
recipients, we remain cautious in concluding a significant positive completion effect for 
more academically prepared recipients.  The NMLLS did not have a meaningful impact 
on the likelihood of graduating within six years for the most academically prepared 
students. 
Table 2.12 presents results of the matching estimation performed on low-income 
students, defined as coming from households with less than $40,000 in annual income.  
We again find little evidence of completion effects in the aggregate, but see meaningful 
effects when disaggregating by student ability.  For low-income, low-achieving students, 
we estimate a large decrease in completion within six years.  For low-income, higher-
achieving students, we find a large increase in completion within six years significant at 
the ten percent-level.  As shown in Table 2.13, we find no significant completion effects 
for students from higher-income households. It appears that our results at higher levels of 
aggregation may be driven by students from families where financial constraints are 
binding. 
2.6.1  Alternative bandwidths, cohorts, and control groups 
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We test results for sensitivity to the choice of the smoothing parameter, or 
bandwidth, in our kernel matching algorithm.  Specifically, we estimate models using 
bandwidths h = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} with the sample stratified by academic preparedness and 
family income, as in our main results.  These results are presented in Appendix 2.B.  
Table 2.B1 presents results for our estimates by graduation semester and academic 
preparation.  In Table 2.B1, larger bandwidths result in larger effect sizes and smaller 
standard errors.  Overall we find a similar pattern relative to our preferred specification.  
That is, we find no evidence of completion effects in the aggregate, but find a positive 
relationship between academic preparation and degree completion.  Tables 2.B2 and 2.B3 
also broadly agree with the results of our preferred specification: significant program 
effects are confined to those from families with lower incomes; the same divergent 
effects are detected, but effect sizes are significantly larger in absolute value.  Appendix 
2.C presents results using different sets of freshmen cohorts.  Although a bit noisier than 
robustness checks using alternative bandwidths, we see a similar pattern of completion 
rates emerge as compared to our preferred specification.17 
We also estimate simple pre-post models of completion using qualified UNM 
resident students before the implementation of the NMLLS as the control group.  
Estimates are produced via logistic regression, where the coefficient of interest is on a 
dummy variable equal to one in years when the NMLLS was in place, and zero 
otherwise.  We assume model errors are independent across cohorts, yet correlated within 
cohorts, thus standard errors are clustered at the cohort level.  Because these models do 
not account for any trends over time, they are limited in this respect.  However, these 
models do not rely on nonresident students as the control group and thus provide insight 
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into whether estimated program effects are some sort of artifact of the data.  Results of 
simple pre-post models reveal a significant 1.6 percentage point (3.6 percent) decline in 
completion rates overall, with a 3.3 percentage point (10.4 percent) decline for low 
achieving high school students.  This offers evidence that the negative completion effects 
we estimate for some NMLLS recipients in preferred specifications are not due to model 
misspecification. 
2.6.2 Regression discontinuity design approach 
 We explore exploiting eligibility requirements of the NMLLS to estimate whether 
the program had any meaningful effect on degree completion at UNM.  Recall that a 
student is eligible for the NMLLS if they are a New Mexico resident, have lived in the 
state for at least one year, graduated from high school or earned their GED in New 
Mexico, immediately enroll in a qualified public institution by the next fall semester, and 
meet credit hour and college GPA requirements during the bridging semester.  The 
NMLLS requires that students complete at least 12 credit hours during the bridging 
semester with a minimum 2.5 GPA.  Accordingly, we limit the sample to all students 
which meet the NMLLS eligibility requirements with the exception of the bridging 
semester GPA requirement, and compare students just above the 2.5 threshold to students 
just below.  We find the regression discontinuity approach appealing because it is simple, 
objective, and requires little information.  It is also relatively straightforward to verify 
with visual checks, easy to interpret estimates, and easy to perform falsification tests.  In 
sum, in many ways it is a cleaner approach than difference-in-differences matching 
estimation. 
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 Because participation in the NMLLS is not strictly a deterministic function of 
college GPA (i.e., other funding sources such as academic or athletic scholarships are 
prioritized above NMLLS funds, for example), we appeal to a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity (FRD) approach using a sample of resident students from 1997 - 2008.  
FRD only requires that there is a significant jump in the probability of treatment 
assignment above the cutoff of the running variable, bridging semester GPA in our case.  
We visually inspect the jump in the probability of NMLLS funding by bridging semester 
GPA in Figure 2.2.  The jump between the quadratic fitted lines below and above the 
threshold is below one (approximately 80 percent), so FRD seems appropriate in our 
context. 
 However, we fail to pass a critical identification test for regression discontinuity 
studies: cutoff manipulation.  Figure 2.3 plots the density of the running variable, here the 
bridging semester GPA.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in gray.  As 
is evident, there is a statistically significant discontinuity in the density of the running 
variable around the NMLLS eligibility cutoff.  It appears some students manipulate this 
eligibility cutoff by perhaps taking easier courses or dropping courses when a poor grade 
is expected.  Since regression discontinuity may be thought of as random assignment in 
the neighborhood of the cutoff, this provides evidence of students nonrandomly selecting 
into treatment and control groups.   Table 2.14 presents results of formal manipulation 
tests using local polynomial density estimators following McCrary (2008) and Cattaneo 
et al. (2017).  The null hypothesis of these tests is continuity in the density of the running 
variable around the bridging semester GPA cutoff.  We strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of density continuity around the GPA cutoff under varying assumptions. 
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2.7 Other possible explanations for the patterns we find 
2.7.1 Program anticipation 
If there were anticipatory effects of the NMLLS, this would violate identifying 
assumptions of the difference-in-differences estimator and would lead to biased results.  
The passage of the lottery scholarship occurred in March 1996 and the policy was 
instituted approximately 17 months later, giving New Mexico students and families two 
semesters to anticipate the policy change and modify their behavior.  This could have 
resulted in some students taking easier high school course loads to ensure high school 
graduation and ultimately NMLLS eligibility.  Such students would be less prepared for 
higher education than their peers but would still be NMLLS-eligible.  This narrative is 
consistent with the proposal that the NMLLS incentivized marginal students to enroll at 
UNM who may have otherwise not enrolled in college or attended a two-year college 
instead. 
Considering whether out-of-state families acted on the anticipated policy, the time 
between passage and implementation likely did not afford a long enough window to 
move to New Mexico and establish program eligibility (at least for the inaugural year) 
due to 1) the requirement of living in New Mexico for at least one year and 2) the high 
costs associated with moving to another state, especially with a student currently 
attending a high school outside of New Mexico.  In either case, we do not detect any 
indication of anticipatory effects evidenced by results from flexible difference-in-
differences models in Tables 2.3 to 2.6. 
 
2.7.2 Confounding factors 
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 A massive increase in enrollment at UNM accompanied the NMLLS (3,715 to 
6,307 resident students).  One possible confounding factor is an increase in wealth.  
Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) show that greater housing wealth both increases the 
likelihood of enrollment at public flagship universities relative to non-flagship schools 
and directly increases the likelihood of college completion.  The authors find that a 
$10,000 increase in real housing wealth increases the relative likelihood of attending a 
flagship university by two percent and the overall completion likelihood by 1.8 percent.  
Simple accounting reveals this is not likely a significant driver of our results.  Over the 
study period real housing prices in New Mexico increased by a scant 0.5 percent.18  If we 
assume a (very) conservative median home price of $215,000 in 1994, this only translates 
into approximate 0.2 percent increases in both relative flagship enrollment and overall 
college completion likelihood.19  Moreover, real personal income only increased by 5.5 
percent over the same period, an annualized growth rate less than one percent per year, so 
it is unlikely that any broad increase in overall wealth drove increases in resident 
enrollment after the launch of the NMLLS.20  We also consider labor market conditions 
as a potential confounding factor.  As we mention above, because our sample period 
spans the longest continuous period of economic growth in the United States since 
WWII, broad economic conditions are unlikely to be driving the enrollment effect of the 
NMLLS. 
2.7.3 Congestion  
 Another possible explanation for the patterns we see are capacity constraints and 
congestion at UNM.  This would explain what we see in Table 2.2—where the academic 
preparation and standardized test scores of nonresidents increase by a statistically 
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significant amount after program implementation.  If the large increase in NMLLS-
qualified students forced the university to admit fewer nonresidents and be more selective 
in their criteria, then we would expect higher “quality” nonresident cohorts post-NMLLS.  
This would result in model results being biased downwards.  However, according to 
university officials, in 1996, the year prior to the implementation of the NMLLS, the 
university was at approximately 50 percent capacity.  Accordingly, they did not 
experience any “bottlenecks” in terms of class size, advising capacity, waitlists for 
classes, et cetera, after the lottery scholarship launched.21  If there was congestion at 
UNM post-NMLLS, this would likely increase students’ time to degree, which we find 
no evidence to support. 
 Another point which merits mention is the funding mechanism under which New 
Mexico public institutions of higher education operate.  New Mexico universities are 
funded using an enrollment formula.  That is, the more students enrolled, the more state 
dollars are allocated to the institution.  This provides an incentive for institutions to 
compete with one another on the basis on enrollment.  There is no de jure limit on the 
number of additional students UNM may enroll in a given semester, so it is likely the 
university simply absorbed this additional enrollment without crowding out other groups, 
such as nonresidents and low-income students. 
2.7.4 Student course-taking behavior 
 Because the incentive to graduate in nine semesters is countered by the incentive 
to maintain a 2.5 GPA under the NMLLS, we are concerned that students may have 
responded to the NMLLS by altering their course-taking behavior.  Specifically, one 
might expect the NMLLS to incentivize students to take fewer credits in order to increase 
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their likelihood of continued eligibility.  If this is the case, then estimates may reflect a 
lengthening of time to degree, not necessarily lower completion rates on behalf of less 
academically prepared students.  Due to this concern, we construct difference-in-
differences matching estimates of cumulative credits earned since enrollment.  These 
estimates are presented in Appendix 2.D. 
Estimates in Appendix 2.D present the effects of the NMLLS on cumulative 
credits earned using the same matching procedure as models of college completion.  
Table 2.D1 provides no evidence of a change in credits attempted overall.  Significant 
positive course-taking effects are detected for academically well prepared students.  
Notably, while effects display the expected negative sign for less academically prepared 
students at UNM, they are not statistically different from zero.  We find evidence that the 
NMLLS incentivized better prepared students to take more credits, where effects range 
from approximately 2 percentage points (7 percent) after the first year to 15 percentage 
points (15 percent) at the six-year mark.  We find that these effects are largely driven by 
students from low-income families.  These results refute the notion that the NMLLS 
resulted in marginally prepared students completing degrees at a slower pace.  We also 
directly test this hypothesis by estimating difference-in-differences matching estimates 
using semesters to graduation as the outcome.  We find no evidence of any change in 
time to degree associated with the NMLLS program. 
2.8. Conclusions 
 We examine the effect of an exceptionally generous and low-bar merit-based 
scholarship on college completion.  We estimate variants of the difference-in-differences 
model using qualified resident students as the treatment group and a matched sample of 
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ineligible nonresident students as the control group.  The common trends assumption is 
supported both visually and empirically.  The sample is stratified by academic 
preparation and family income to see which, if any, subgroups are driving completion 
effects.  We conduct kernel matching and examine its success through rigorous testing.  
A flexible difference-in-differences model is estimated to verify that program effects are 
limited to treatment years.  Sensitivity to cohorts included as well as the smoothing 
parameter used in the matching alogirthm are reported.  We also estimate models of 
credit accumulation and time to degree completion, in addition to exploring the validity 
of a regression discontinuity approach in estimating completion effects of the NMLLS. 
 Our analysis reveals a divergent effect of the NMLLS: more academically 
prepared high school students are more likely to graduate in six years compared to their 
nonresident counterparts, while the opposite is true for less academically prepared 
recipients of the NMLLS.  These countervailing results mask completion effects of the 
NMLLS in the aggregate.  We find positive completion effects for those with above 
average high school GPA similar in magnitude to those in the literature, and negative 
effects for lower achieving scholarship recipients, consistent with discouragement from 
raising expectations for marginal students that otherwise would not have attended 
college, or at least a four-year college. 
 Results suggest that low-income, high achieving high school students benefit 
from the NMLLS, while lower-achieving students do not.  The latter may be explained by 
overmatching at UNM, where marginally prepared students that would have otherwise 
chosen to pursue an easier course of study at another institution, or not attend college at 
all, attend the state’s flagship university because the scholarship renders it more 
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affordable.  Discouragement may also play a role.  Students that lose the scholarship may 
expect higher costs and a lower likelihood of completion, and so may be more likely to 
drop out than nonresidents with similar academic performance. 
 The main conclusion that we draw from our analysis is that setting the bar too low 
in terms of merit aid may be detrimental to the success of the least academically prepared 
students.  The promise of generous financial aid tied to seemingly modest academic 
criteria may actually worsen college persistence for students with weaker academic 
preparation.  When price signals in the market for higher education are removed, as is the 
case with the NMLLS, many students may choose to attend institutions for which they 
are a poor match (i.e., are less academically prepared than their peers). 
 Since its inception in 1997, the NMLLS has seen significant changes.  Starting in 
the 2014-2015 academic year, the scholarship was capped at seven semesters (plus the 
initial bridging semester) and initial and renewal credit requirements were increased from 
12 to 15 credits earned per semester.  A statewide budget crisis in 2017 resulted in the 
legislature making major cuts to the NMLLS—whereas the scholarship paid 100 percent 
of tuition over our study period, the program only covers approximately 60 percent of 
tuition as of the 2017-2018 academic year.  The 2017 Regular Session saw the passage of 
SB 420, which allows students to take a “gap” year after high school and still remain 
eligible for the NMLLS.  It is not clear how recent program changes will affect student 
course-taking and persistence at UNM.  A decline in scholarship generosity will reduce 
access to higher education in New Mexico, but may be necessary given the constant 
financial pressure the Lottery Scholarship Fund faces.  Raising the bar in terms of initial 
eligibility and renewal requirements sends a signal to high school students that they are 
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expected to work harder than before, which may result in more efficient spending (i.e., 
less funding of marginally prepared students that ultimately drop out) and shorter time to 
degree.  Allowing for a “gap” year is sure to increase program costs for an already 
financially troubled program. 
 Considering the poor financial health of the NMLLS, it may be time to narrow the 
program and prioritize funding for certain students.  Our results suggest that completion 
effects may be driven by low-income families.  Adding a family-income cap or some 
other type of need-based component would reduce overall program costs and target 
spending towards those that seem most responsive to the NMLLS.  A need-based 
component would also make the NMLLS more politically tenable, as it is often slated as 
a major regressive tax in New Mexico.   
 In general, further research is needed to investigate how to increase degree 
completion, not merely enrollment, while avoiding harming less academically prepared 
students.  One potential remedy may be to pair lottery scholarship funds with stronger 
academic supports such as additional mandatory advising, mid-semester check-ups, or an 
additional one-credit mandatory course on topics such as scholarship details and 
strategies for academically suriving the freshmen year.  Another potentially promising 
reform would be to tie program eligibility to high school performance rather than college 
performance.  Having intitial and renewal requirements tied to college performance 
provides incentives for undesired student behaviors, such as padding GPAs with easier 
coursework or taking fewer credits so as to increase the likelihood of continued 
scholarship eligibility. 
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 Our results inform recent proposals to make college free for a large proportion of 
students, whether at the state- or national-level.  Our findings suggest that such proposals, 
which effectively remove price differentials between public colleges, may distort 
students’ college choice decisions.  In order to maximize the value of such scholarships, 
students may increasingly overmatch by choosing more prestigious public colleges for 
which they are underprepared.  
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Note:  The plots above show the likelihood of degree completion for incoming 
cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999.  Solid lines represent resident students while 
dashed lines represent nonresident students.  The vertical bars at 1997 mark the 
implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship. 
Figure 2.1 Pre-post trends in the probability of graduating, by residency 
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Note:  Points depict the within-bin sample average of NMLLS receipt probability by 
bridging semester GPA.  A quadratic fit has been added below and above the cutoff 
at 2.5.  The number of bins is calculated using the mimicking-variance evenly 
spaced method using spacing estimators.  The uniform kernel is used to construct the 
global polynomial estimators.  The plot provides visual evidence of the 
appropriateness of a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) approach. 
Figure 2.2 Jump in treatment probability around the bridging semester GPA cutoff 
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Note:  Figure 2.3 presents the density of the running variable (bridging semester 
GPA) around the NMLLS eligibility cutoff with 95 percent confidence intervals in 
shown in gray. This plot was constructed using a local cubic approximation.  The 
uniform kernel is used to construct the global polynomial estimators.  The plot 
reveals a statistically significant discontinuity in the running variable density around 
the eligibility cutoff. 
Figure 2.3 Bridging semester density around the bridging semester GPA cutoff 
  
0
.2
.4
.6
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Bridging Semester GPA
Density of Bridging Semester GPA around Eligibility Cutoff
 42 
 
Table 2.1 Full-time resident tuition at all NMLLS-eligible institutions 
 
 
  
Institution
Program Length 
(years)
Tuition 
and Fees
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 4 7,000     
University of New Mexico 4 6,950     
New Mexico State University 4 6,729     
Western New Mexico University 4 6,644     
Eastern New Mexico University 4 5,630     
New Mexico Highlands University 4 5,550     
New Mexico Military Institute 2 5,179     
Northern New Mexico College 4 5,112     
Mesalands Community College 2 1,990     
San Juan College 2 1,773     
Central New Mexico Community College 2 1,340     
Clovis Community College 2 1,324     
Santa Fe Community College 2 1,196     
New Mexico Junior College 2 1,158     
Luna Community College 2 968        
Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute 2 730        
Source:   Institution financial aid department websites.   Accessed 28 March 2017.  
Figures present tuition and fees for one academic year taking fifteen credit hours per 
semester.  For two-year schools it is assumed the student is within the community 
college district, where applicable.
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Table 2.2 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program 
  Residents  Nonresidents 
Variable  Before After Diff.  Before After Diff. 
         
Grad. in 4 Yrs  .114 .103 -.011*  .153 .154 .001 
              
Grad. in 4.5 Yrs  .195 .189 -.006  .210 .211 .002 
              
Grad. in 5 Yrs  .345 .332 -.013  .290 .297 .008 
              
Grad.in 6 Yrs  .447 .420 -.027***  .334 .319 -.015 
              
HSGPA  3.312 3.273 -.038***  3.233 3.300 .067** 
  (.502) (.471)   (.532) (.503)  
              
ACT  22.530 22.176 -.354***  22.317 22.861 .544** 
  (3.834) (3.887)   (4.109) (4.096)  
              
Remedial  .264 .290 .026***  .164 .227 .063*** 
              
Income < $40K  .230 .205 -.025***  .155 .162 .007 
              
Female  .571 .565 -.006  .526 .545 .019 
         
Hispanic  .386 .375 -.011  .147 .166 .020 
         
Native  .043 .045 .002  .041 .051 .010 
         
Asian  .047 .037 -.010**  .034 .026 -.008 
         
Black  .021 .022 .002  .082 .080 -.002 
Observations 
                   
3,715  
                
6,307   
                   
587  
                
649   
              
Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels, respectively.  
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.3 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999 
 
 Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Leads and Lags 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
     
NMLLS t-2 -.004 -.014 -.006 -.018 
 (.035) (.040) (.045) (.047) 
     
NMLLS t-1 .005 -.021 -.025   -.041 
 (.036) (.042) (.046) (.049) 
     
NMLLS t0 .012 -.001 -.024 -.019 
 (.035) (.040) (.045) (.047) 
     
NMLLS t+1 .027 .010   .012 .00007 
 (.034) (.039) (.044) 
 
(.047) 
 
NMLLS t+2 -.004 .006   .004 .010 
 (.034) (.038) (.043) 
 
(.045) 
 
R2 .0872 .1020 .1131 .1173 
     
Observations    11,258 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Ordinary least squares 
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 given.  Reported 
coefficients are on interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy 
variable.  Models include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for 
race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family 
income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented.  *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA ≤ 3.28 
 
 Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Leads and Lags 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
     
NMLLS t-2 .003 .009 .005 .005 
 (.033) (.038) (.052) (.057) 
     
NMLLS t-1 -.023 -.031 -.019   -.034 
 (.038) (.048) (.057) (.064) 
     
NMLLS t0 -.037 -.064 -.092 -.102 
 (.037) (.047) (.058) (.062) 
     
NMLLS t+1 .005 -.020   -.073 -.111* 
 (.031) (.042) (.055) 
 
(.060) 
 
NMLLS t+2 .015 -.002   -.039 -.032 
 (.029) (.039) (.053) 
 
(.056) 
 
R2 .0177 .0306 .0435 .0520 
     
Observations    5,502 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Ordinary least squares 
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with less than or 
equal to average high school GPAs given.  Reported coefficients are on 
interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy variable.  Models 
include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for race, ethnicity, 
standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family income. The 
period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA > 3.28 
 
 Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Leads and Lags 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
     
NMLLS t-2 -.005 -.034 -.013 -.038 
 (.065) (.071) (.076) (.077) 
     
NMLLS t-1 .022 -.023 -.038   -.052 
 (.063) (.070) (.074) (.075) 
     
NMLLS t0 .047 .038 .020 .036 
 (.060) (.065) (.071) (.072) 
     
NMLLS t+1 .046 .028   .080 .089 
 (.060) (.066) (.071) 
 
(.072) 
 
NMLLS t+2 -.007 .018   .044 .043 
 (.060) (.064) (.069) 
 
(.070) 
 
R2 .0685 .0663 .0651 .0620 
     
Observations    5,756 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Ordinary least squares 
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with above average 
high school GPAs given.  Reported coefficients are on interactions between 
cohort years and a resident dummy variable.  Models include resident and cohort 
dummies as well as controls for race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high 
school GPA, gender, and family income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the 
NMLLS was implemented.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA > 3.78 
 
 Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Leads and Lags 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
     
NMLLS t-2 .067 -.012 .032 -.011 
 (.119) (.122) (.128) (.130) 
     
NMLLS t-1 -.035 -.143 -.066   -.083 
 (.124) (.127) (.133) (.133) 
     
NMLLS t0 .148 .161 .198 .220* 
 (.121) (.123) (.131) (.134) 
     
NMLLS t+1 .003 -.021   .068 .072 
 (.123) (.125) (.129) 
 
(.131) 
 
NMLLS t+2 .051 .031   .089 .053 
 (.118) (.121) (.126) 
 
(.129) 
 
R2 .0608 .0623 .0594 .0451 
     
Observations    2,112 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Ordinary least squares 
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with high school 
GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean are given.  Reported 
coefficients are on interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy 
variable.  Models include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for 
race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family 
income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented.  *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 NMLLS student attrition, 1994-1999 
 
Semester Residents Eligible Percent Remaining 
2 
                          
2,664  100.0% 
3 
                          
2,249  84.4% 
4 
                          
2,017  75.7% 
5 
                          
1,863  69.9% 
6 
                          
1,734  65.1% 
7 
                          
1,629  61.1% 
8 
                          
1,568  58.9% 
9 
                          
1,510  56.7% 
Source: Office of Institutitonal Analystics, University of New 
Mexico.  We consider the sample of resident students that met 
cumulative GPA and credit requirements in their first semester to 
qualify for the NMLLS. 
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Table 2.8 Estimated parameters for propensity score model of NMLLS data, 1994-1999 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error 
   
HSGPA 1.729** .724 
ACT .498*** .090 
Remedial .891*** .118 
Income < 20K .268* .158 
Income < 40K .160 .108 
Female 1.670*** .367 
Hispanic 1.865*** .550 
Native American 1.884** .923 
Asian .032 .207 
Black -5.729*** 1.155 
Declined to state race-ethnicity -.108 .282 
ACT2 -.013*** .002 
ACT*Black .141*** .045 
Female*White -.571*** .146 
HSGPA2 -.461*** .116 
ACT*Female -.053*** .016 
ACT*HSGPA .059*** .020 
Remedial*Asian 1.147** .505 
GPA*Black .546 .339 
ACT*Native -.082** .041 
Female*Native -.608* .317 
HSGPA*Hispanic -.312* .165 
   
Constant -7.711*** 1.600 
   
Observations  11,258 
   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * correspond to 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Propensity scores are estimated using a logistic model.  Forty-nine 
observations were dropped following estimation of the propensity 
score to ensure overlap, leaving 11,209 observations. The variable 
Declined to state race-ethnicity is equal to one if the student declined 
to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2.9 Power calculation for regressions on subgroups, 1994-1999  
 
 
Power
Group Mean SD Obs. Mean SD Obs.
All Family Incomes
Full Sample0.43 0.495 9978 0.327 0.469 1231 0.995
HSGPA ≤ 3.280.299 0.458 4901 0.199 0.4 572 0.654
HSGPA > 3.280.557 0.497 5077 0.438 0.497 657 0.985
HSGPA > 3.780.661 0.474 1879 0.509 0.501 226 0.872
Family Income < $40,000
Full Sample0.366 0.482 2104 0.276 0.448 192 0.437
HSGPA ≤ 3.280.236 0.425 1037 0.181 0.387 94 0.153
HSGPA > 3.280.492 0.5 1067 0.379 0.488 95 0.381
HSGPA > 3.780.602 0.49 374 0.5 0.509 30 0.231
Family Income ≥ $40,000
Full Sample0.448 0.497 7874 0.336 0.474 1034 0.985
HSGPA ≤ 3.280. 16 0.465 3864 0.2 0.4 471 0.584
HSGPA > 3.280.575 0.495 4010 0.449 0.498 561 0.968
HSGPA > 3.780.6 6 0.468 1505 0.51 0.501 196 0.814
Residents Nonresidents
Note:   We calculate the power to detect a five percent change in completion rates at the 
five percent significance level.  This is done by testing the difference-in-differences 
estimator in a linear probability model of six-year completion rates.
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Table 2.10:  Means and normalized differences after kernel matching, full sample, 1994-
1999 
 
 
Means are from Epanechnikov kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2.  
Normalized differences (ND) are calculated by taking the difference average covariate 
values by residency status and dividing by a measure of standard deviation. 
  
Variable Res. Nonres. ND Res. Nonres. ND
HS GPA 3.31 3.27 0.088 3.27 3.33 -0.122
Composite ACT 22.56 22.37 0.047 22.19 22.58 -0.099
Remedial 0.26 0.24 0.032 0.29 0.28 0.012
Income < $40,000 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.2 0.21 -0.032
Female 0.57 0.58 -0.009 0.56 0.59 -0.063
Hispanic 0.39 0.39 -0.019 0.37 0.36 0.025
Native 0.04 0.04 0.001 0.05 0.05 -0.03
Asian 0.04 0.03 0.058 0.04 0.03 0.019
Black 0.02 0.02 -0.023 0.02 0.02 0.018
Pre-NMLLS Post-NMLLS
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Table 2.11: NMLLS graduation effects by years since first enrollment, kernel matching, 
1994-1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample 11,209 -.035 -.030 -.024 -.019 
  (.023) (.027) (.033) (.035) 
      
     𝑌ത  .114 .195 .345 .447 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28 5,473 -.015 -.035 -.069* -.087** 
  (.022) (.029) (.040) (.043) 
      
     𝑌ത  .044 .094 .222 .316 
      
GPA > 3.28 5,734 -.022 .016 .069 .094* 
  (.036) (.043) (.048) (.050) 
      
     𝑌ത  .176 .284 .453 .561 
      
GPA > 3.78 2,105 .031 .082 .093 .107 
  (.070) (.072) (.080) (.081) 
 
     𝑌ത  .246 .359 .542 .642 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from difference-
in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below average or 
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high 
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the 
baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years since first enrollment.  
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Table 2.12: NMLLS graduation effects, kernel matching, family income < $40,000, 
1994-1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample 2,296 -.011 -.012 -.037 -.020 
  (.038) (.043) (.060) (.070) 
      
     𝑌ത  .085 .139 .276 .377 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28 1,131 .003 -.018 -.197** -.202** 
  (.011) (.032) (.081) (.090) 
      
     𝑌ത  .030 .064 .180 .257 
      
GPA > 3.28 1,162 .022 .037 .161 .200* 
  (.076) (.082) (.100) (.115) 
      
     𝑌ത  .136 .207 .363 .486 
      
GPA > 3.78 404 -.091 -.032 .151 .054 
  (.148) (.168) (.221) 
 
(.228) 
 
     𝑌ത  .164 .270 .478 .629 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from difference-
in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below average or 
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high 
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the 
baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years since first enrollment.  
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Table 2.13: NMLLS graduation effects, kernel matching, family income ≥ $40,000, 
1994-1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample 8,908 -.035 -.028 -.015 -.010 
  (.027) (.031) (.037) (.039) 
      
     𝑌ത  .122 .212 .365 .467 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28 4,335 -.018 -.040 -.035   -.055 
  (.028) (.036) (.045) (.048) 
      
     𝑌ത  .048 .104 .234 .335 
      
GPA > 3.28 4,571 -.027 .011 .033 .058 
  (.041) (.047) (.052) (.052) 
      
     𝑌ത  .187 .307 .480 .583 
      
GPA > 3.78 1,701 .055 .109   .096 .130 
  (.075) (.077) (.084) 
 
(.085) 
 
     𝑌ത  .269 .384 .560 .646 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using 
the Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years 
since first enrollment. 
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Table 2.14. Testing for manipulation of the bridging semester GPA cutoff for NMLLS 
eligibility 
 
 
 
  
left right left right T p-value T p-value
h- ≠ h+
T2(h1) 0.511 0.524 1748 4591 5.263 < .001 3.831 < .001
T3(h2) 0.489 0.445 1591 3806 4.109 < .001 4.245 < .001
T4(h3) 0.653 0.616 1977 5433 3.096 0.002 4.895 < .001
h- = h+
T2(h1) 0.524 0.524 1750 4591 5.270 < .001 3.822 < .001
T3(h2) 0.445 0.445 1569 3806 4.090 < .001 4.564 < .001
T4(h3) 0.616 0.616 1903 5433 3.095 0.002 5.193 < .001
Robust Test
Note:   Here we present results from manipulation test following McCrary (2008) and Cattaneo et al. 
(2017).  The subscript on T  denotes the order of the local polynomial used to construct the bias-
corrected density point estimators.  The subscript on h  denotes the order of the local polynomial used to 
construct the density point estimates.  A uniform kernel was used to construct local polynomial estimators.  
We perform tests with identical and different data-driven bandwidths.  Conventional and robust test 
staistics test the null hypothesis of continuity of the bridging semester GPA around the NMLLS eligibility 
cutoff.
Bandwidths Effective Obs. Conv. Test
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Notes  
2 See Sjoquist and Winters (2012) for a complete list. 
3 The College Board, Trends in Student Aid 2015, Figure 28A and Figure 28B.  
Retrieved January 29, 2016 from http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/trends-
student-aid-web-final-508-2.pdf. 
4 As of the 2017-2018 academic year, the NMLLS only covers approximately 60 
percent of tuition at UNM. 
5 Hillary Clinton and Sen. Bernie Sanders both proposed similar versions of this 
policy during the 2016 presidential campaign.  Sen. Sanders advocated free tuition at all 
public universities and colleges, while Clinton advocated for a $125,000 household 
income cap.  Retrieved 22 Aug 2017 from 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/04/sanders-democratic-colleagues-
introduce-new-free-college-bill.  New York recently launched the Excelsior Scholarship, 
making tuition at all SUNY and CUNY two- and four-year colleges free for residents 
from families with annual incomes up to $125,000.  Retrieved 1 November 2017 from 
https://www.ny.gov/programs/tuition-free-degree-program-excelsior-scholarship.  
6 Because Scott-Clayton did not limit the sample to those who took the ACT only 
once, her marginal program students were able to manipulate their test scores, so that 
those above differed in unobserved characteristics, like ambition. But even though Bruce 
and Carruthers limit their sample to students who took the ACT only once, they face a 
similar situation: students just below the cutoff sample who did not re-test might contain 
a higher proportion of low-ambition students, relative to those just above the cutoff, who 
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had less incentive to retest.  Thus selection alone is unlikely to explain the discrepancy 
between the studies.   
7 We were unable to find any reference to the cutoff online, except as reported in 
Castleman and Long, and that figure is more than 10 years old. 
8Georgia Student Finance Commission, GACollege411, Georgia Hope 
Scholarship Program Overview.  Retrieved May 29, 2013 from   
https://secure.gacollege411.org/Financial_Aid_Planning/HOPE_Program/Georgia_s_HO
PE_Scholarship_Program_Overview.aspx. 
9Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, Tennessee Hope Scholarship.  
Retrieved May 29, 2013 from 
http://www.tn.gov/collegepays/mon_college/hope_scholar.htm. 
10Florida Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Aid, Florida 
Student Scholarship and Grant Programs, Chart of Eligibility and Award Criteria.  
Retrieved May 29, 2013 from  
http://www.floridastudentfinancialaid.org/ssfad/PDF/BFEligibilityAwardChart.pdf. 
111995-1996 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report, U.S. Department of 
Education, online at https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-historical/pell-
eoy-1995-96.pdf (accessed 26 March 2017).  
12 King, Jacqueline E. “Missed Opportunities: Students who do not Apply for 
Financial Aid,” American Council on Education Issue Brief, 2004. Online at 
http://www.soe.vt.edu/highered/files/Perspectives_PolicyNews/10-04/2004FAFSA.pdf 
(accessed 1 April 2017). 
13 For degree earning students entering UNM between 1994 and 1999, average 
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time to degree was 4.79 years with a standard deviation of .66 years. 
14 We conduct a sequential search for quadratic terms to include in the propensity 
score model.  We start by estimating logistic models that include all terms in levels and 
one of all possible quadratic terms.  We then calculate the likelihood ratio statistic for the 
null hypothesis that the most recently added quadratic term has a coefficient of zero.  We 
select for inclusion the quadratic term with the highest test statistic over 2.71, 
corresponding to a z-statistic of 1.645.  We then add this covariate to the “baseline” 
model and repeat this process until all the remaining likelihood ratio statistics are below 
the threshold of 2.71. 
15 There are 9,979 resident students and only 1,233 nonresident students in the 
sample.  One-to-many matching allows us to proceed without a significant loss in 
information.  For example, if we were to conduct a simple nearest neighbor matching 
procedure, estimates would (at most) be based on 1,233 matches, or 2,466 observations, 
which constitutes approximately 22 percent of the sample.   
16 Results are similar when we split the sample around the median high school 
GPA. 
17 We also used New Mexican residents who delayed enrollment (and were 
therefore not eligible for NMLLS) as a control group.  These non-traditional students are 
likely to differ in unobservable ways from students who entered college right away, 
especially given the large tuition penalty for delaying enrollment once the NMLLS was 
in place.  A student who missed out on the scholarship by delaying enrollment might 
have less maturity or some difficulty to overcome before starting college, characteristics 
that would also make completion less likely.  Indeed, in models that use non-traditional 
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students as the control group, we find unrealistically large program effects of 27.4 
percentage points (76.3 percent) overall for students from lower income families.  
Program effects for high achieving, low income students are estimated to be 46 
percentage points (93.9 percent).   These effects likely tell us more about the negative 
chances of students who were unable to enroll in college right away, than the positive 
impact on graduation. 
18 US. Federal Housing Finance Agency, All-Transactions House Price Index for 
Albuquerque, NM (MSA), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Retrieved September 22, 
2016 from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ATNHPIUS10740Q.  July 1994 to July 1999 
is examined.  Prices are adjusted for inflation using BLS’s CPI less shelter measure 
(Series CUUR0000SA0L2), retrieved 18 Aug 2017 from https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/srgate.  
19 The $215,000 figure is the median listed home price in Albuquerque according 
to Zillow.com as of June 30, 2017.  Obtained 18 Aug 2017 at 
https://www.zillow.com/albuquerque-nm/home-values/. 
20 Calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis’ annual personal income 
estimates for 1994 and 1999 (SA1 Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, 
Population, Per Capita Personal Income) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual CPI-
U estimates for 1994 and 1999 (Series CUUR0000SA0).  Retrieved 18 Aug 2017 from 
https://www.bea.gov/itable/ and https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate, respectively. 
21 Interview with Dr. Terry Babbitt, Vice President of the Enrollment 
Management Division, conducted April 19, 2017. 
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Chapter 3: Wage Effects of Baccalaureate Time to Degree in the United States  
 
Only 42 percent of students earning baccalaureate degrees in the United States 
graduate within four years, compared to 53 percent three decades ago.  Despite this shift, 
and plenty of concern about potential harm to students on behalf of state legislators and 
university officials, we know very little about whether delayed graduation carries a labor 
market penalty.  Researchers examining time to degree using cross-sectional data report a 
negative relationship between time to degree and earnings, which presumably reflects 
ability.  Increases in time to degree, however, cannot reasonably be linked to lower 
ability over time.  Using two nationally-representative longitudinal studies, we proxy for 
student ability and instrument for time to degree, and find no evidence of a labor market 
penalty for delayed graduation.  Moreover, the potential loss of earnings from later post-
graduation entry into the labor market may easily be countered by higher earnings during 
school for those who take longer to finish. Together, these findings suggest that taking 
longer to complete college is not necessarily a problem that needs fixing. 
3.1 Introduction 
 Most college graduates in the United States spend more than four years earning a 
baccalaureate degree, a fact that has drawn alarm from some researchers, policymakers, 
and media outlets.  Among the proposed remedies are higher penalties for withdrawing 
from courses, course credit pricing penalizing students taking fewer than 15 credits, and 
endorsement of “lockstep” programs that restrict student choice in courses, making it 
more difficult to change majors.22  In 2016, the Obama administration proposed two 
significant changes to the federal Pell Grant program.  The first provision would have 
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provided approximately 700,000 students “making real progress toward on time 
graduation” with an additional $1,915 on average to help pay for college and complete 
their degrees faster.”  The second provision, dubbed the “on-track Pell bonus,” would 
have raise the maximum Pell award by $300 for approximately 2.3 million students that 
take 15 credits per semester in an academic year, a policy meant to encourage the receipt 
of a bachelor’s degree in four years.23  Critics contend that such policies overload 
students that necessarily work during college, or that enter higher education marginally 
prepared for college-level courses.  Kinsey and Goldrick-Rab (2015) provide evidence 
that tying additional need-based aid to academic performance may only serve to slow 
down students, which may take fewer classes the next semester if their current semester 
GPA suffers.  Support for such incentives remains broad, however.  Backers of these 
measures cite the high cost to students of delaying entry into the labor market, 
particularly how lengthened time to degree may encourage students to take on additional 
debt.  We are interested in whether “delayed” students incur wage penalties beyond 
opportunity costs associated with solely taking longer to obtain a degree.  This is a 
contemporary issue: in 2012 alone, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and New 
Mexico passed legislation aimed at reducing time to degree at their public universities. 
 Time to degree has increased dramatically in recent decades.  In the 1970s, 53 
percent of college graduates earned their degrees in four years.  Twenty years later, only 
39 percent had done so.  For non-top-50 public universities the decline was even 
steeper—from 50 percent in the 1970s to 29 percent in the 1990s.  Researchers posit the 
trend cannot be explained by changes in student preparedness or composition, and instead 
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find evidence that decreased resources per student at less selective public universities and 
students working more during college are likely causes (Bound et al., 2012).  Students 
who work more while enrolled in college have lower opportunity costs and it may be that 
the reduced opportunity costs compensate for delayed entry into the labor market.  
Students have always had the option of taking more credits and not changing majors, so it 
bears exploring whether going through college more slowly might be a good strategy, 
rather than a mistake. 
 We address this question in two steps.  First, we examine a simple human capital 
model to explore under what circumstances combining part-time work and a 5- or 6-year 
path to degree attainment might be optimal.  Second, we ask whether longer time to 
degree is penalized in the labor market.  For the latter question, human capital theory 
holds that additional years of education increases the productivity of workers, thereby 
affording higher wages in the labor market.  Under human capital, if students complete 
the same amount of credits over a longer period of time, then time to degree should have 
no direct effect on wages.  Yet, if time to degree serves as a productivity signal to 
employers, then those finishing sooner versus later may be valued as being more 
productive in the labor market. 
 Several researchers report a negative association between earnings and time to 
degree, which they attribute to student ability.  This association alone does not rule out 
the human capital hypothesis, since the real test is whether workers with the same ability, 
but different time to degree, are compensated differently.  We perform this test by 
controlling for ability and instrumenting for time to degree with the institutional average.  
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We believe our instrument is plausible because institutional policies and norms surely 
affect a student’s college trajectory, but should have no bearing on labor market rewards 
apart from the institution’s quality, which we also control for. 
 Our findings suggest that concern over delayed graduation may be misplaced.  
Under plausible assumptions about hours worked in college, the return to a college 
degree, and discount rates, students may come out ahead when they work while earning a 
degree in five or six years.  Addressing endogeneity using Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS), we find time to degree has no association with near-term labor market earnings. 
3.2 Simple model of human capital 
We appeal to a simplified discrete multi-stage human capital investment problem 
similar to Turner (2004).  The framework is modified to examine the circumstances under 
which students rationally prefer a mixture of part-time work (i.e., 30 hours per week) and 
part-time school (i.e., six years to graduation), to working 10 hours per week, attending 
college full-time, and graduating in the “normal time” of four academic years. 
Define 𝑌ுௌ and 𝑌஼ as earnings before and after college completion, respectively.  
For ease of exposition, we assume students in this scenario may work 30 hours per week, 
earning ଷ
ସ
𝑌ு each year, and attend school part-time for six years, paying 𝐹 annually in 
direct costs.  Students may also choose to work 10 hours per week, attend school full-
time, and graduate in four years.  We assume that the costs of part-time and full-time 
enrollment are equal.  Students prefer to earn a baccalaureate degree in six years while 
working part time over the traditional four-year path to degree attainment if 
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holds, a condition that may be reduced to 
(2) ସ[௒಴ାி]
௒ಹೄ
< ଶ(ଵା௥)
లା(ଵା௥)మିଷ
௥(௥ାଶ)
.24 
Whether equation (2) holds depends on parameters in the maximization problem, 
including student risk preferences, direct college costs, and the returns to a baccalaureate 
degree.  All else equal, students are more likely to pursue a nontraditional (and longer) 
path to college completion when 1) discount rates are high, 2) the returns to a college 
degree are lower, and 3) the direct costs of schooling are relatively low.  For example, 
using figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, let YHS = $34,600 and YC = $57,800.25 
To demonstrate how time to degree may vary, we choose one non-top 50 public 
university (University of New Mexico) and one top 50 public university (University of 
Washington) where F is equal to $7,146 and $10,974, respectively.  Assuming a fairly 
standard discount rate of r = .05, the simplified model results in the UNM student 
preferring to take six years while working part-time over the traditional four-year path 
working ten hours per week.  Because direct college costs are larger, the UW student 
prefers the traditional four-year path under these conditions.  However, if we increase the 
discount rate to r = .10 then both the UNM and UW students prefer the nontraditional 
path to degree attainment.  Note that this simplification of human capital assumes no 
uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of college, and does not consider the 
possibility of binding credit constraints.  However, the exercise demonstrates that 
students may rationally choose a longer, nontraditional path to degree attainment under 
reasonable assumptions. 
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3.3 Is delayed graduation punished in the labor market? 
Existing literature does not answer the question of whether lengthened time to 
degree penalizes workers.  Previous studies do not control for one confounding factor or 
another: none control for institutional characteristics, which likely impact both time to 
degree and earnings after graduation (Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; Brodaty et al., 2009; 
Flores-Lagunes and Light, 2010; Aina and Pastore, 2012).  Only Groot and Oosterbeek 
(1994) include a proxy for student ability.  Without adequately controlling (or 
instrumenting) for such factors, it is impossible to isolate the effect of time to degree in 
the earnings function.  For example, low ability students generally earn less money than 
their high ability counterparts, but will still increase their earnings by obtaining a degree.  
Moreover, students that attend lower quality institutions may earn less than those 
attending higher quality institutions, however it may be the characteristics of the 
institution that are contributing to the wage penalty, not necessarily the time it takes the 
student to complete.  It is thus unlikely that previous studies are able to fully separate 
student and institutional characteristics from time to degree. 
To operationalize our investigation of wages and time to degree, we present a 
linear model of wages for baccalaureate degree earners closely following that of Brodaty 
et al. (2009). Let 𝑑 be the graduate’s time to degree in months.  Subscripts are omitted for 
ease of exposition.  Graduation delay, 𝐷, is defined as the individual’s time to degree less 
“normal time” to degree, defined as 45 months, so that 𝐷 ≡ 𝑑 − 45.26  We assume that an 
individual’s productivity is given by 𝑞 and takes the form 
(4)  𝑙𝑛(𝑞) = 𝑎଴𝑆 + 𝑏଴𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐଴ + 𝜃ଵ + 𝜃ଶ 
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where 𝑿 is a vector of controls (including potential experience and its square, race, ethnicity, 
and gender) observed by both the researcher and the employer.  Graduate degree attainment 
is given by 𝑆, indicating receipt of a master’s or doctoral degree at the time of follow-up.  
The direct productivity effect of schooling is given by 𝑎଴, which we expect to be 
nonnegative.  Similarly the direct productivity effect of graduation delay is 𝑏଴, expected to be 
nonnegative since it can be viewed as a measure of age or maturity.  The terms 𝜃ଵ and 𝜃ଶ 
measure student ability, the former being observed only by the employer, the latter 
unobserved by both the researcher and the employer.  Ability measures are assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero, finite variances, and nonnegative covariances.  
Employers observe graduation delay, given by 
(5)  𝐷 = 𝑿𝑐ଵ + 𝒁𝑔ଵ + 𝑓ଵ𝜃଴ + 𝜉ଵ 
 
where 𝜃଴ is another unobserved measure of student ability that is likely positively 
correlated with 𝜃ଵ and 𝜃ଶ.  The vector 𝒁 captures exogenous sources of variation in 
graduation delay not observed by the employer, assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝜃௝  for 
all 𝑗.  These instruments affect graduation delay but are not reported in job application 
materials nor are they otherwise observable by the potential employer.27  To identify a 
causal link between time to degree and subsequent wages, graduation delay is 
instrumented using the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at the student’s degree 
granting university. 
If employers set wages equal to the expected productivity of workers, conditional 
on their information set, wages can be expressed as  
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(6) 𝑤 = 𝐸[𝑞|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ]. 
We assume that wages are distributed as log-normal.  Since ability and error terms 
are normally distributed, 𝑙𝑛(𝑞) conditional on (𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ) is also normally distributed.  
Thus, we may write 
(7) 𝑤 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝐸[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ] +
ଵ
ଶ
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ]}. 
Normal vectors exhibit the property that the conditional variance 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ] does not depend on (𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ), meaning we can treat it as a 
constant and include it in 𝑿.  This gives us the equation 
(8) 𝑙𝑛(𝑤) = 𝑎଴𝑆 + 𝑏଴𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐଴ + 𝜃ଵ + 𝐸[𝜃ଶ|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ].   
Having assumed that ability is normally distributed, conditional expectations are 
linear and given by 
(9) 𝐸[𝜃ଶ|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃ଵ] = 𝑎ଷ𝑆 + 𝑏ଷ𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐ଷ + 𝑓ଷ𝜃ଵ 
which can be substituted in equation (8) to arrive at a modified version of Mincer’s 
(1974) human capital earnings function 
(10) 𝑙𝑛(𝑤) = (𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଷ)𝑆 + (𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଷ)𝐷 + 𝑿(𝑐଴ + 𝑐ଷ) + (1 + 𝑓ଷ)𝜃ଵ. 
Note that graduation delay appears in the earnings function as it is a signal 
conveying information about unobserved productivity, 𝜃ଶ.  The coefficient on graduation 
delay is composed into two components: 𝑏଴, the direct productivity effect of graduation 
delay and 𝑏ଷ, the signaling effect of graduation delay, each which are not identified 
individually.  We infer whether results support human capital or the screening hypothesis 
based on the sign of (𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଷ).  As mentioned, we expect 𝑏଴ to be nonnegative in sign.  
Thus, if the coefficient on graduation delay is negative, this constitutes evidence of time 
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to degree communicating a negative productivity signal.  A nonnegative coefficient on 
graduation delay is considered support for human capital theory. 
3.4. NCES data 
We use ELS:2002 data for our analysis, which allows us to observe students’ 
secondary, postsecondary, and subsequent labor market outcomes for the 2004 graduating 
high school cohort.  The ELS:2002 documentation explicitly notes the survey was 
intended to inform policymakers of the “rate of progress through postsecondary 
curriculum” and the “social and economic rate of return on education to both the 
individual and society” (Ingalls et al. 2014, pp. 10).  The dependent variable in our 
analysis is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011 dollars.  This measure is obtained 
from sample members at the fourth and final follow-up.  The final follow-up takes place 
eight years after students’ high school graduation cohort date, defined as June 1, 2004.  
We limit the sample to college students who earned a high school diploma and enrolled 
in college within two years.  This includes students who did not graduate high school in 
normal time.  Because the survey only follows students eight years after their expected 
high school graduation, it does not permit analysis of nontraditional students such as 
those that matriculate in their late 20s or later. 
Bound et al. (2012) find that trends in time to degree across 1972 and 1992 
graduating high school cohorts vary significantly according to the student’s first 
institution type.  The authors classify students’ first institutions into five categories: non-
top 50 public colleges, top 50 public colleges, less selective private colleges, highly 
selective private colleges, and community colleges.  This categorization is based on 2005 
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U.S. News & World Report college rankings.  Highly selective private colleges include 
the top 50 ranked private colleges, the top 65 ranked liberal arts colleges, and four U.S. 
Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval 
Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy.  We use the 
same categorization scheme as Bound et al. (2012), with the exception of excluding 
students that started at community colleges since they do not have selectivity or 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data.28 
Several variables are included in wage equations in order to help isolate the effect 
of time to degree on earnings.  Standardized test scores, measured in terms of the 
composite ACT score, are included to capture observed student ability.29  Higher 
standardized test score achievement is expected to be positively correlated with future 
earnings (Betts and Grogger, 2003).  Potential work experience and its square are 
included, as workers earn more as they acquire additional labor market experience, but at 
a diminishing rate (Mincer, 1974; Heckman et al., 2003; Lemieux, 2006).  Variables 
capturing whether a post-baccalaureate degree has been earned are included, as additional 
credentials are expected to increase future earnings (Card, 2001).  Also included are 
controls for respondent gender, race, and ethnicity.  A set of state dummies account for 
heterogeneity across labor markets in the United States.  Institution quality is proxied 
using the 2004 Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index.  We instrument the 
student’s time to degree with the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at the student’s 
first institution.  These rates are reported in the IPEDS.  This measure is intended to 
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capture the prevalence of graduation beyond normal time at the institution-level.30  See 
Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics of the instrument for various institution types.   
Table 3.11 presents the cumulative distribution of time to degree as well as its 
mean for ELS:2002 data.  We include data from Bound et al. (2012) in order to examine 
whether trends in time to baccalaureate degree have persisted using this most recent 
NCES survey.  Table 3.1 suggests that the overall mean time to degree has not changed 
significantly across 1992 and 2004 graduating high school cohorts, standing most 
recently at 4.83 years.  Average time to degree for those at non-top 50 public colleges 
held steady at 4.93 years across 1992 and 2004 cohorts.  At top 50 public schools there 
was a marked decrease in time to degree from 4.66 to 4.42 years, an average difference of 
approximately three months.  The percent of graduates completing in four years or less at 
these schools increased from approximately 40 to 57 percent.  There were small increases 
(decreases) in time to degree for students starting at highly (less) selective private 
institutions.  Overall it seems that the alarming increases in time to baccalaureate degree 
found by Bound et al. (2012) may have slowed if not stabilized. 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics by first institution type for variables 
included in the analysis.  The average hourly wage for the full sample is $20.57, with 
wages highest for those starting at highly selective private institutions, and lowest for 
those starting at non-top 50 public institutions.  Graduation delay varies widely according 
to first institution type.  It averages just under one year for students at non-top 50 public 
universities but is only approximately 3.5 months for students at highly selective private 
schools.  Figure 3.1 presents a histogram of graduation delay, revealing that roughly 45 
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percent of students in the sample graduated within six months of normal time.  The 
largest spike in delay is between zero and six months after the 45-month mark, where the 
distribution decays thereafter.  The instrumental variable, time to degree ratio, averages 
roughly two for the full sample.  This is interpreted as having twice as many students 
graduating within six years relative to four years.  We see similar variation by institution 
type compared to the graduation delay variable.  Approximately 24 percent of the full 
sample had a master’s degree at the last follow-up, while six percent held a doctoral 
degree.  ACT composite scores are lowest for students starting at non-top 50 public 
institutions, and highest for those starting at highly selective private institutions.  The 
majority of the sample consists of white women. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1 Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
 We first wish to examine whether it is even necessary to use 2SLS in estimating 
wage penalties from delayed baccalaureate graduation.  This can be done through 
implementing Hausman’s (1978) test for endogeneity.  This test offers a formal way of 
examining whether the error term in the earnings function is correlated with our measure 
of graduation delay.  To conduct this test, we estimate the reduced form equation for 
graduation delay and save the fitted residuals from this equation.  We then estimate the 
earnings function including all of exogenous variables, graduation delay, and the fitted 
residual.  Rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the fitted residual is not 
statistically different from zero suggests that graduation delay is endogenous, and 2SLS 
must be used.  We estimate the coefficient on the fitted residual to be 0.1003 with a 
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standard error of 0.0385, providing strong evidence that endogeneity of the time-to-
degree variable in the wage equation is a problem that must be dealt with. 
3.5.2 Instrument Relevance and Instrument Exogeneity 
Valid estimation via 2SLS requires two conditions be met.  First, the instrument 
should be highly correlated with the endogenous variable.  This can be assessed using a 
simple t-test on the instrument in the first stage equation.  Second, the instrument should 
only affect the dependent variable through the endogenous variable.  Because the latter 
requires knowledge of the true model error, this requirement cannot be tested and instead 
must be maintained.  Table 3.3 presents results for the full sample.  We note that the first 
stage regression suggests strong positive correlation between time to degree ratio and 
graduation delay variables.  A one-unit increase in the time to degree ratio increases 
graduation delay by just less than one month.  We reject the null of the simple t-test at the 
one percent level, providing evidence of instrument relevance.  An F-statistic of 11.71 in 
the first stage suggests the 2SLS model does not suffer from weak instruments. 
Instrument exogeneity requires that time to degree at the student’s institution only 
affects earnings through the student’s time to degree.  We suspect that time to degree at 
the student’s institution affects the student’s own time to degree through what could be 
considered a sort of “peer effect.”  If a large proportion of one’s peers in college are 
planning on overshooting normal time, the student may be more likely to consider this a 
valid path to degree attainment.31  There are many other reasons why this relationship 
may hold as well.  It may reflect institution quality in some broad sense, the resources 
available to the student, or the additional tuition costs associated with delayed graduation.  
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This motivates us to include the admissions competitiveness index in the models in order 
to capture many broad measures of institution quality, helping to isolate the causal path 
from institution time to degree to wages through the student’s own time to degree. 
First stage results show that higher ability translates into shorter time to degree, 
consistent with Flores-Lagunes and Light (2010).  Women were found to be less likely to 
exceed graduation in normal time, while Hispanic students were shown to have longer 
time to degree.  We interpret admissions competitiveness dummies as relative to schools 
deemed as “Most Competitive.”  Coefficients on these measures suggest that the less 
competitive the school, the higher the time to degree.  Wage equation estimates also bear 
many features that one would expect from an earnings function.  We see large positive 
returns to obtaining a master’s and doctoral degree.  Wages are increasing in experience, 
but at a decreasing rate.  Higher ability results in higher wages—a ten point increase in 
the composite ACT score results in a ten percent increase in wages.  Results reveal a 5.4 
percent wage penalty for women compared to men, a 9.4 percent for black workers 
compared to white.  Students starting at less competitive colleges earn lower wages. 
Most importantly, Table 3.3 reveals a pattern we find repeatedly—while OLS 
estimates find that a one month delay in graduation results in wage penalty of 
approximately 0.5 percent (approximately six percent for one year of delay), we find no 
evidence of any wage penalty after instrumenting for graduation delay.  OLS estimates, 
of which previous studies report similar effect sizes, are clearly misleading.  Table 3.4 
provides evidence that results do not differ by the student’s first institution type.  Non-
top-50 public schools, top-50 public schools, and less selective private schools again 
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reveal one-month graduation delay penalties of 0.5-0.6 percent (6-7 percent per year), 
while 2SLS reveal no penalty.  For highly selective private schools, both OLS and 2SLS 
results are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, preliminary findings support the human capital hypothesis that earning 
the same degree over a varying length of time has no effect on the returns to a college 
degree.  In other words, we find no evidence that time to degree serves as a productivity 
signal to prospective employers. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Time to degree may be costly for students, institutions, and society at large.  Our 
results provide evidence that delaying one’s graduation does not result in any sort of 
wage penalty.  It is hoped this study will inform policymakers on the costs and benefits of 
lengthened time to degree, especially those at institutions currently considering or 
actively discouraging alternative paths to degree completion which take longer than 
normal time.  Reducing time to degree, which appears to have been taking place at some 
institutions since the study of the 1992 high school cohort, may free up additional 
resources for new students.  Our results provide evidence that utility-maximizing students 
may be better off pursuing a longer path to degree attainment.  It is important to then 
consider the growing proportion of nontraditional students in higher education, and to 
promote policies accommodating their rational decision to work during school and take 
fewer credit hours per semester, in contrast to supporting policies which penalize students 
for not remaining on track to graduate in four years—policies which may ultimately hurt 
their very chances of completing college at all. 
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Source:  Education Longitudinal Study of 2002.  TTD is the student’s time 
to degree in months.  The histogram displays the distribution of graduation 
delay using six month bins.  Approximately 45 percent of students in the 
sample graduated with six months of normal time. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Histogram of graduation delay, baccalaureate earners, ELS:2002 
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Table 3.1 Time to degree (TDD) distributions for all graduates by first institution type 
 
 
 
Mean
4 5 6 7 TTD
Full Sample:
NLS72 53.1 81.8 90.6 96.3 4.48
NELS:88 39.4 72.7 88.3 94.7 4.81
ELS:2002 42.3 72.1 85.7 93.5 4.83
Non-top 50 public:
NLS72 49.7 82.3 91.1 96.3 4.49
NELS:88 29.1 68.8 87.8 95.1 4.93
ELS:2002 34.2 68.5 85.0 94.1 4.93
Top 50 public:
NLS72 52.7 81.5 89.2 96.4 4.49
NELS:88 39.7 82.0 93.7 96.6 4.66
ELS:2002 56.7 85.2 95.2 98.1 4.42
Less selective private:
NLS72 66.7 87.3 94.0 98.7 4.28
NELS:88 58.0 84.6 93.4 98.6 4.60
ELS:2002 56.1 83.4 92.5 96.1 4.51
Highly selective private:
NLS72 65.2 88.2 93.8 96.8 4.31
NELS:88 73.1 91.9 98.1 99.8 4.20
ELS:2002 68.6 91.7 96.3 98.2 4.28
Community college:
NLS72 36.5 67.8 83.0 92.6 4.90
NELS:88 15.5 44.2 70.8 83.6 5.58
ELS:2002 16.5 43.9 64.4 81.6 5.69
TTD Distribution
Note: NLS72 and NELS:88 figures reproduced from Bound, 
Lovenheim, and Turner (2012).  ELS:2002 calculations were made 
using third follow up panel weights.  In each survey the sample 
includes baccaluareate-earners enrolling at a postsecondary 
institution with two years of their high school cohort graduation 
month.  High school cohort graduation month is assumed to be June 
1972 for NLS72, June 1992 for NELS:88, and June 2004 for 
ELS:2002.  Students were followed for eight years following their 
high school cohort graduation month.
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Table 3.2 Sample characteristics of employed college graduates in the ELS:2002 
 
 
   
  
 
78
Table 3.3 OLS and 2SLS wage models of graduation delay penalty, all institutions 
 
 
  
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Graduation Delay Wages Wages
Graduation Delay -0.005*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.009)
TTD Ratio 0.778***
(0.146)
Master's 0.204*** 0.258***
(0.064) (.0079)
Doctorate 0.537*** 0.575***
(0.130) (0.138)
Experience 0.839 0.198** 0.224**
(0.624) (0.090) (0.095)
Experience Squared 0.274** -0.021* -0.026**
(0.123) (0.012) (0.013)
ACT Composite -0.424*** 0.005** 0.010**
(0.055) (0.002) (0.005)
Female -2.900*** -0.089*** -0.054*
(0.406) (0.018) (0.033)
Hispanic 1.999** -0.016 -0.037
(0.841) (0.037) (0.042)
Black 0.735 -0.086** -0.094**
(0.792) (0.035) (0.037)
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Table 3.3 OLS and 2SLS wage models of graduation delay penalty, all institutions 
(continued) 
 
  
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Graduation Delay Wages Wages
American Indian -1.198 -0.049 -0.034
(3.324) (0.148) (0.152)
Asian 1.042 -0.000 -0.012
(0.918) (0.041) (0.043)
Two or More Races -0.295 -0.050 -0.046
(1.042) (0.046) (0.048)
Hawaiin or Pacific Islander -3.030 0.152 0.179
(5.235) (0.232) (0.240)
Highly Competitive 0.940 -0.003 -0.014
(0.855) (0.038) (0.040)
Very Competitive 1.717** -0.001 -0.023
(0.774) (0.034) (0.039)
Competitive 2.883*** -0.047 -0.087*
(0.802) (0.035) (0.048)
Less Competitive 7.943*** 0.010 -0.085
(1.147) (0.051) (0.091)
Non-Competitive 3.428** -0.095 -0.144*
(1.444) (0.064) (0.076)
Special Designation 0.894 -0.018 -0.030
(3.030) (0.135) (0.139)
Observations 3,297
F-statistic 11.71 5.10 4.35
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.100 0.044
Source: Education Longitudinal Study of 2002.  Robust standard errors are reported below 
estimated coefficients.  The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011, 
at the third follow-up.  Time to degree is in months and centered at 45, the time it takes to 
complete a bachelor's degree in "normal time."  All specifications include state fixed effects.  
In 2SLS specifications, the student's time to degree is instrumented by the ratio of six- to 
four-year graduation rates at their university.
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Table 3.4 Estimates of graduation delay penalty by first institution type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Time-to-Degree -0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.012
0.001 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.045 0.004 0.015
Observations 1369 713 780 435
Adjusted R-Squared 0.136 0.090 0.221 0.208 0.174 0.170 0.241 0.227
Non-Top 50 Public Top 50 Public Less Selective Private Highly Selective Private
Source: Education Longitudinal Study of 2002.  Robust standard errors are reported below estimated coefficients.  The dependent variable 
is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011, at the third follow-up.  Time to degree is in months and centered at 45, the time it takes to 
complete a bachelor's degree in "normal time."  All specifications include state fixed effects.  In 2SLS specifications, the student's time to 
degree is instrumented by the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at their university.
  
 
81
 
Notes
22 See, for example, the “15 to Finish” policy promoted by Complete College 
America and other nonprofits.  Online at 
http://completecollege.org/docs/GPS_Summary_FINAL.pdf, accessed 13 November 
2016.  As of 2013, five statewide higher education systems and at institutions in fifteen 
states had adopted 15 to Finish.  This information is online at 
http://www.completecollege.org/news.html, accessed 13 November 2016.   
23 U.S. Department of Education, Fact Sheet: Helping More American Complete 
College: New Proposals for Success, released 19 January 2016, online at 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-helping-more-americans-complete-
college-new-proposals-success, accessed 13 November 2016. 
24 See Appendix 4.A for the derivation of equation (3). 
25 Unemployment rates and earnings by educational attainment, 2016.  Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, online at https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm (accessed 22 
March 2018). 
26 Forty-five months was chosen as it represents a “four-year” stay from fall in 
year one to spring in year four.  A histogram of time to degree in months is presented 
below which appears to support this choice. 
27 As demonstrated in Brodaty et al. (2009), this assumption may be relaxed 
without loss of generality. 
28 See Appendix 4.B for a detailed list of which colleges fall in each category. 
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29 The National Center for Education Statistics provides a standardized test score 
variable in the ELS:2002 which includes all composite ACT scores and includes an 
equivalent score in terms of composite ACT for students that chose to instead take the 
SAT. 
30 This measure was chosen because average time to degree is not available at the 
institution-level in the IPEDS. 
31As one respondent told Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009), graduating in 
four years is like “leaving the party at 10:30pm.” 
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Chapter 4: Merit Aid Scholarships and Human Capital Production in STEM: 
Evidence from New Mexico 
The New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship is a broad, “low-bar,” state 
lottery-funded scholarship designed to increase access to higher education on behalf of 
New Mexico residents.  The natural experiment of a state lottery scholarship is used to 
measure the effect of generous financial aid on major choice at New Mexico’s flagship 
public university.  A potential unintended consequence of state merit aid scholarships is 
to discourage the production of human capital in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) fields.  This may occur if students avoid more rigorous majors in 
order to increase the likelihood of scholarship retention.  I find no evidence that the 
scholarship decreased the overall likelihood that a student first declares a STEM major or 
earns a STEM degree.  There are significant effects when disaggregating by academic 
preparation: less-academically prepared entering freshmen are 6.8 percentage points (40 
percent) less likely to initially declare a STEM major, while more-academically prepared 
entering freshmen are 12.1 percentage points (44.3 percent) more likely to initially 
declare a STEM major.  No significant effects are found when examining whether a 
STEM degree was earned.  Evidence suggests these effects are at least in-part due to 
compositional changes in the student body before and after the advent of the lottery 
scholarship. 
4.1 Introduction 
 The introduction of broad, merit-based college scholarships in the 1990s created a 
natural experiment for measuring relationships between college costs and academic 
outcomes.  State merit-based scholarships generally fund most if not all tuition for 
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qualified resident students.  State legislation establishing merit-based scholarships share 
several common goals: retaining talent in-state, increasing access to higher education by 
reducing financial burdens, and promoting timely completion.  There is considerable 
variation in initial and continuing eligibility requirements across states.  Researchers have 
cataloged how such programs affect enrollment and course taking behavior, and, more 
recently, degree completion.  I analyze the effect of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery 
Scholarship (NMLLS), a uniquely “low-bar” merit-based scholarship, on student major 
choice.  Specifically, this paper is interested in two related research questions.  First, do 
generous, low-bar merit scholarships discourage students from choosing majors in 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)?  Second, do such 
scholarships affect the number of STEM degrees produced? 
 The major focus of this paper is on the first research question.  Since merit-based 
scholarships require students to maintain a set level of academic achievement in order to 
continue to receive aid, there are potential unintended consequences that may occur, 
including dissuading students from studying more difficult subjects, including those 
categorized as STEM.  The consequences of this outcome may be significant to economic 
interests at both the state and national levels, as STEM occupations are often seen as 
major drivers of innovation, and well as key to economic growth.  
 Since 1993, 27 states have implemented merit-based scholarships, the first and 
most studied being Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally, or HOPE, 
scholarship program.32   HOPE marked the beginning of what has been a major 
restructuring of the financial aid landscape in America.  According to the College Board, 
from 1993 to 2013, the percentage of total undergraduate state grant aid for which 
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students’ financial circumstances were considered decreased from 90 percent to 76 
percent.  In the 2013-2014 academic year, New Mexico was one of 13 states where this 
percentage was below 40 percent.33 
 We know more about the relationship between financial aid, enrollment, and 
degree completion than financial aid and major choice.  Different types of financial aid 
have varying effects on college enrollment.  Loans tend to have little to no effect, while 
grants have a positive and significant effect on student enrollment (Linsenmeier et al. 
2006).  Students from low-income families and students of color seem to be most 
responsive to such aid.  Van der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates that students’ choice of 
college are sensitive to financial aid offers.  Several studies show a significant and 
positive relationship between grant aid and student enrollment (Seftor and Turner 2002; 
Kane 2003; Heller 2009) and a negative relationship between net cost and enrollment 
(McPherson and Schapiro 1991).  The effects of merit-based aid on enrollment have also 
been well documented.  In an experimental setting, Monks (2009) finds large, positive 
effects of merit aid on enrollment.  Studying HOPE, Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000 
award increased student enrollment by approximately four percent.  Also studying 
HOPE, Cornwell et al. (2006) find the program increased student enrollment by 6 
percent.  In New Mexico, Binder and Ganderton (2002, 2004) find that while the NMLLS 
boosted enrollment at four-year colleges in New Mexico, the effect appears to be driven 
by additional enrollment of students that otherwise would have attended college out-of-
state.  The effect of merit aid on college completion has also been studied. 
 Analyzing statewide educational attainment data, Sjoquist and Winters (2012, 
2015b) found no difference in college attainment for those exposed to lottery scholarship 
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programs. Using a similar methodology, Jia (2017) found that program features matter: 
lower initial scholarship eligibility requirements increased two-year degree attainment, 
and funding generosity increased the completion of a bachelor’s degree.  Scott-Clayton 
(2011) found completion effects of 9.4 percentage points (59 percent) for students just 
above an ACT cut-off for West Virginia’s lottery-funded PROMISE scholarship 
program, compared to students just below.  Using similar strategies, Bruce and 
Carruthers (2014) and Welch (2014) found no program effect for Tennessee’s lottery 
scholarship.  Erwin and Binder (see Chapter 2) found no overall effect of generous, low-
bar merit aid on college completion.  Divergent effects appeared when disaggregating the 
sample by academic preparation.  Less-academically prepared students appeared to 
exhibit lower completion rates as a result of the scholarship while more-academically 
prepared students exhibited higher completion rates, two significant effects similar in 
magnitude but opposite in sign.  The authors argue that changes in student composition 
are potentially driving results.  
I examine how the NMLLS affects STEM engagement at the University of New 
Mexico (UNM) by exploring changes in 1) the likelihood of initially declaring a STEM 
major and 2) the likelihood of earning a baccalaureate degree in a STEM field before and 
after the implementation of the scholarship for eligible resident students and a matched 
sample of nonresident (and therefore ineligible) students.  Estimates reveal no significant 
overall effect of the NMLLS on declaring a STEM major or earning a STEM degree.  
However, there are large and statistically significant completion effects after 
disaggregating by academic preparation.  Academically less-prepared eligible freshmen 
are 6.8 percentage points (40 percent) less likely to first declare a STEM major, while 
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academically more-prepared freshmen are 12.1 percentage points (44.3 percent) more 
likely to first declare a STEM major, compared to ineligible peers with similar high 
school GPAs.  In addition, there is evidence that some program effects may be a result of 
the NMLLS inducing compositional changes in the student body. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses existing literature regarding 
merit-aid and major choice, and introduces the NMLLS; Section 3 presents a theoretical 
model of major choice; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 summarizes the empirical 
approach; Section 6 discusses main findings and robustness checks; Section 7 discusses 
other explanations for patterns found in the results; and Section 8 concludes. 
4.2 Merit aid and major choice 
The natural experiment of lottery-financed merit-based aid programs provides a 
promising avenue for determining the relationship between aid and major choice.  
Several studies have analyzed how students sort into different majors.  An early study of 
this behavior can be found in Berger (1988).  Berger uses a life cycle approach that 
assumes students choose majors based on the expected discounted stream of future 
earnings rather than beginning wages following graduation.  The author provides 
evidence to support this approach using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men.  Montmarquette et al. (2002) relax two assumptions common in previous 
literature, including Berger (1988):  uniform probabilities of success across majors and 
constant earnings streams across majors.  Using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth, the authors estimate the probability of success across different majors for all 
students in the sample.  These data are combined with estimates of predicted future 
earnings in all majors from Rumberger and Thomas’s (1993) analysis of the 1987 Survey 
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of Recent College Graduates, which allows the construction of a multinomial logit model 
of major choice.  Results suggest that one’s expected earnings stream is the most 
significant factor influencing major choice, yet the probability of success is an important 
factor as well.  Arcidiacono et al. (2012) argues that both expected earnings and students’ 
perceived abilities across majors are important determinants of major choice. 
Arcidiacono (2004) estimates a dynamic model of college major choice, finding 
that even after controlling for selection, large earnings premiums and ability differences 
still exist for some majors.  Differences in monetary returns explain little of the ability 
sorting across majors.  Instead, Arcidiacono (2004) provides evidence that virtually all 
ability sorting is due to differences in preferences for taking particular majors in college 
and workplace preferences for jobs likely to be obtained after graduation, the former 
being more influential than the latter.  Similarly, Beffy et al. (2010) find a small, but 
statistically significant, positive earnings elasticity of major choice, suggesting that 
nonpecuniary factors are a large part of major choice (e.g., preferences for workload, 
workplace conditions, opportunities field research, et cetera.). 
 Focusing on STEM fields, Wang (2013) finds that choosing a STEM major is 
positively related to high school performance, as well as initial college 
performance/experiences.  Similarly, Griffith (2010) finds that differences in academic 
preparation and educational experiences drive differences in persistence rates in STEM 
majors.  Wiswall and Zafar (2015) find that while expected earnings and perceived ability 
play a major role in choosing STEM, unobserved tastes are the largest factor in major 
choice.  Henry and Rubenstein (2002) argue that merit aid may result in greater effort on 
  89
behalf of high school students, thus better preparing students for difficult majors such as 
those included in STEM.  
Four studies directly examine the relationship between merit aid and major 
choice.  Analyzing Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, Cornwell et al. (2006) use 
administrative data to compare qualified residents and nonqualified nonresident students 
in a difference-in-differences framework.  The authors find that HOPE resulted in a small 
1.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood that residents chose education majors, 
relative to their nonresident counterparts.  Cornwell et al. (2006) do not find any 
meaningful change in the likelihood that students chose STEM majors due to the advent 
of HOPE.  Both Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell et al. (2006) find evidence that state 
merit-based scholarships increase the likelihood that highly-academically prepared 
students stay in-state for college, and thus affect the type and quality of institutions 
attended.  This implies that crowding out of moderately-academically prepared students 
may occur as competition increases within more difficult majors. 
Using Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System files, Zhang (2011) 
examines whether Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship and Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship 
affected the likelihood that students embarked on a course of study within STEM fields. 
Zhang uses differences-in-differences estimation for aggregate state data, and finds a 
statistically significant 1.6 percentage point (11.4 percent) increase in the proportion of 
degrees classified as STEM at private institutions in Florida, but no broader effect of 
merit aid on STEM degree completion in either Florida or Georgia.  Two significant 
problems should be noted with this approach.  Since the unveiling of such programs 
affects how students sort into institutions, it is difficult to distinguish compositional 
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change from real program impact (see Chapter 2, for example).  Also, asymptotic 
refinement should be applied in situations where there are relatively few treated units or 
policy changes in a difference-in-differences framework (Conley and Taber, 2011). 
Stater (2011) uses administrative data from three large public universities to 
examine the relationship between tuition and financial aid on the first major a student 
declares.  He finds that larger net tuition results in students being more likely to choose 
professional fields such as architecture, business, or law and less likely to declare majors 
in humanities and sciences.  Merit aid was shown to increase the likelihood of declaring 
majors in humanities and sciences, while having a negative effect on social sciences.  It is 
difficult to view these estimates as causal, however, since Stater does not address the 
endogeneity of merit aid: students that receive merit aid are better academically prepared 
for college.  Thus, recipients may be more likely to choose STEM majors for reasons 
other than merit aid. 
A recent paper regarding the relationship between merit aid and major choice 
comes from Sjoquist and Winters (2015a).  Their analysis relies on a difference-in-
differences strategy using American Community Survey (ACS) microdata.  They assign 
treatment status to individuals that were 18 years of age in a state where a merit aid 
program was in place, with all others assigned to the control group. Sjoquist and Winters 
divide the 27 adopting states into “strong” and “weak” merit aid state categories, based 
on their judgement of how broad-based programs are and how much funding they 
provide.  New Mexico is defined as a strong merit aid state.  Findings suggest that state 
merit-based scholarships reduce the rates of STEM completion.  Overall, strong merit aid 
programs (from 9 states) were found to reduce the number of male STEM graduates by 8 
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percent, with no meaningful impact on women in the sample.  The overall impact of 
merit aid on the production of STEM degrees is estimated to be -6.5 percent.  The authors 
argue that men may be more willing to switch majors in order to retain a merit-based 
scholarship.  Weak merit aid programs were not found to have any effect on STEM 
degree completion.  There are several notable weaknesses in Sjoquist and Winters 
(2015a).  The authors are also not able to control for student-level characteristics, which 
is important as merit aid may result in changes in student composition.  Also, as noted in 
Jia (2017), program features matter, and vary considerably across programs.  With this in 
mind, approaches which treat all state merit-aid programs as homogeneous are 
problematic.   
Literature on the relationship between merit aid and major choice is not in 
agreement, but the most dependable studies suggest either null or negative effects on 
STEM degree completion.  In this study, I employ a rich administrative data set from 
New Mexico’s flagship university to revisit this question and others.  The main 
contribution to the literature is that I control for, and disaggregate by, student-level 
characteristics, which allows for more detailed insight into the effects of merit aid on 
subpopulations.  Cornwell at al. (2006) control for high school GPA, but do not split the 
sample as I do, so it’s difficult to interpret how academic preparation impacts major 
choice.  I also consider how compositional changes in academic preparation of the 
student body play an important role in interpreting results. 
 
4.2.1 NMLLS program details   
The NMLLS, established by the New Mexico Legislature in 1996, first became 
available to students in fall 1997.  New Mexico residents qualify for the NMLLS if they 
  92
earn a high school diploma or general educational development equivalency in New 
Mexico and enroll at a public postsecondary institution in the first regular fall or spring 
semester following high school graduation.  Most state lottery scholarship programs 
reward high school achievement and begin with the first semester of college enrollment.  
In New Mexico, however, students become eligible for full tuition at any of the 16 
qualified public two- or four-year colleges after they complete a full-time course load (at 
least 12 credits) with a 2.5 GPA or higher in their first college semester.  To encourage 
students to try for the scholarship, New Mexico colleges offer students “Bridge to 
Success” scholarships which completely or mostly offset tuition in their first semester.  In 
the period examined, students could receive the award for up to eight semesters, provided 
they enroll full-time, continuously, and maintained a cumulative 2.5 GPA.  Only 58 
percent of first semester students over 1994-1999 met NMLLS requirements, and only 30 
percent remained eligible at the end of their second year. 
Before the NMLLS, New Mexico nearly exclusively awarded financial aid based 
on need.  According to a 1994 National Association of State Student Grant & Aid 
Programs report, New Mexico devoted an average of $222 per full-time equivalent (FTE) 
undergraduate student in financial aid in the 1993-1994 academic year.  Of the $222 total 
per FTE, only $3 (1.4 percent) was merit-based.  By contrast, in 2000, New Mexico 
allocated $687 per undergraduate FTE, with $368 (54 percent) being merit-based.  It 
appears the NMLLS not only supplemented rather than supplanted student aid, but 
drastically changed the student aid landscape throughout the state. 
Compared to states with similar programs, NMLLS eligibility requirements are 
relatively “low-bar.”  For example, Georgia’s HOPE scholarship requires students to 
  93
graduate high school with a 3.0 cumulative GPA and maintain a 3.0 GPA in college.34  
Eligibility for Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship requires minimum ACT/SAT scores in 
addition to the 3.0 high school GPA requirement.  Renewal requires a 2.75 minimum 
overall GPA after attempting 24 and 48 credit hours, and requires a 3.0 minimum overall 
GPA at 72- and 96-credit hour reviews.35  Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship has three 
levels of merit-based awards, each with varying high school GPA, standardized test 
scores, and community service requirements.36 
If financial constraints are binding for students, then the NMLLS should have the 
desired effect of increasing access to higher education and boosting resident enrollment.  
However, due to low-bar initial and ongoing scholarship qualifications of the NMLLS, 
much of the increase in resident enrollment may be on behalf of less-academically 
prepared students who otherwise would have enrolled at a less prestigious university, a 
two-year program at a community college, or perhaps not have enrolled in college at all.  
With price signals in the market for higher education removed, some students may 
choose to embark on a more prestigious, yet riskier, academic path—one that maximizes 
the “worth” of the scholarship (i.e., that which covers the largest cost).37  Because the 
NMLLS is structured so that students lose the scholarship permanently if they fail to meet 
renewal requirements in any semester, some students may respond to merit aid by 
choosing easier majors which improve their chances of scholarship retention.  In this 
case, the NMLLS could have the unintended consequence of decreasing the proportion of 
students choosing and ultimately completing degrees in STEM fields.  However, as 
discussed above, renewal requirements for the NMLLS are relatively low.  If students 
expect their probabilities of success in STEM majors are sufficiently to satisfy eligibility 
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criteria then students may not avoid pursuing majors in STEM.  The direction of any 
estimated program effects relies heavily on the academic preparation of resident students 
before and after the introduction of the NMLLS, and is ultimately an empirical question.  
Composition of the student body at UNM is discussed in detail below. 
4.3 Merit aid and major choice 
Students’ choice of college major are modeled using a modified life-cycle 
approach developed by Montmarquette et al. (2002).  This approach holds that students 
choose college majors so as to maximize lifetime utility, which depends on expected 
earnings and the likelihood of merit scholarship retainment.  For simplicity, assume that 
students who are able to retain merit aid ultimately graduate with a bachelor’s degree.  
Let pij be the likelihood of scholarship retainment for student i in major j.  The expected 
lifetime utility for student i choosing major j, E(Uij), is a function of predicted future 
earnings so that: 
(1)     𝐸(𝑈௜௝) = 𝑝௜௝(𝑿)𝑒௜௝(𝒁) + ቀ1 − 𝑝௜௝(𝑿)ቁ 𝑒௜଴(𝒁),   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚, 
where X includes factors influencing the probability of retaining the scholarship, 
including academic preparation.  The vector Z includes factors affecting earnings after 
college.  eij are the discounted value of lifetime earnings after completing a degree in 
major j and ei0 are discounted value of lifetime earnings after losing the scholarship and 
dropping out of college without a degree.  Students will choose major j over major k 
whenever E(Uij) ≥ E(Uik) for all k ≠ j, or whenever, 
(2)     𝑝௜௝(𝑿)ൣ𝑒௜௝(𝒁) − 𝑒௜௞(𝒁)൧ + ൣ𝑝௜௝(𝑿) − 𝑝௜௞(𝑿)൧[𝑒௜௞(𝒁) − 𝑒௜଴(𝒁)] ≥ 0. 
According to equation (2), if the likelihoods of retaining merit aid differ 
substantially across majors, and lifetime earnings differences across majors are relatively 
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small, then success probabilities will play a major role in major choice.  If likelihoods of 
scholarship retainment are approximately the same, then expected earnings will be the 
major driver in the choice of major.  Thus, one would expect highly-academically 
prepared students, whose likelihoods of retaining the merit scholarship are high across all 
majors, to be more likely to choose majors based on which has the highest expected 
return (i.e., STEM).38  For less-academically prepared students, I assume the likelihood 
of retaining the merit scholarship is lower for some majors relative to others, thus these 
students choose majors primarily on the basis of success probabilities, and choose majors 
which are less difficult.  Importantly, this simplified model does not account for tastes 
and preferences of students, which the literature has indicated plays an important role in 
major choice (Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy et al., 2010; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). 
In the context of whether broad, low-bar merit scholarships such as the NMLLS 
affect student major, the theoretical framework above suggests that more-academically 
prepared students will tend to embark on more difficult, higher-paying majors such as 
those in STEM fields, while less-academically prepared students will tend to avoid such 
majors in favor of less-difficult majors, such as those within education and the liberal 
arts, for example.  
4.4 Data set 
The analysis uses administrative data for all first-time, full-time entering 
freshmen at UNM before and after the implementation of the NMLLS to estimate effects 
on major choice.  UNM enrolls over 20,000 students each year in the City of 
Albuquerque, the largest metropolitan area of the state with over 500,000 residents.  
UNM is nearly an open-enrollment institution.  Data include socio-demographic 
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information (age, race, ethnicity, gender, family income, declined to state race-ethnicity), 
high school academic performance (high school GPA, standardized test scores, indication 
of remedial coursework at UNM), and college academic outcomes by semester (credits 
earned, declared major, college GPA, date of graduation).  Majors are categorized into 
five areas using ACS definitions: STEM, liberal arts, education, business, social science, 
and health-related.39  I also consider alternative definitions provided by UNM as a 
robustness check.  Data are complete with the exception of family income and high 
school GPA.  The data set only contains family income for FAFSA-filers, constituting 51 
percent of the sample.  For those that did not submit a FAFSA, it is assumed their family 
income is sufficiently high (i.e., ≥ $40,000) as to not qualify for the Federal Pell Grant 
Program.  This assumption is supported by a 1995-1996 Federal Pell Grant End-of-Year 
Report showing that less than two percent of Pell recipients had family income in excess 
of $40,000.40  This assumption is not perfect.  King (2004) estimates that in 2000 over ten 
percent of all Pell-eligible students did not file a FAFSA.41  If the analysis in King (2004) 
holds for our data set, then there would exist systematic measurement bias in the family 
income variable—some lower income students would be incorrectly placed in the higher 
income category.  High school GPA is missing for home-schooled students, a small 
portion of matriculating students at UNM.  For these students, they are assigned the mean 
high school GPA of 3.28. 
Models concentrate on the years 1994 to 1999, bounding the policy change by 
three years before and after implementation.  These years encompass the largest 
economic expansion in the U.S. since World War II.  During this period labor market 
conditions in New Mexico were gradually tightening but remained relatively stable, so 
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one needs not to worry much that broad economic conditions are driving results.  To my 
knowledge, there were no concurrent policy changes at the high school or postsecondary 
level in New Mexico over the 1994-1999 period which would have differentially 
impacted enrollment and/or major choice for residents and nonresidents. 
In preferred specifications, recent high school graduates from New Mexico (who 
are NMLLS eligible) are compared with those from out of state (who are not eligible, but 
experience the same campus environment), while excluding foreign students. 
Table 4.2 compares summary statistics for resident and nonresident students 
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS.  It appears the composition of these 
groups changed across pre- and post-treatment periods.  In years before the 
implementation of the NMLLS, resident students had higher high school GPAs and ACT 
composite scores compared to years following the implementation of the scholarship.  
Moreover, students matriculating after implementation were more likely to take remedial 
coursework at UNM.  These changes are statistically significant, suggesting that the 
NMLLS may have induced students with weaker academic preparation to enroll at UNM.  
Table 4.2 also shows that residents were less likely to come from lower-income families 
following implementation of the NMLLS, another indication of a compositional effect.  
The academic achievement of nonresident students improved following implementation 
of the scholarship, according to HSGPA and composite ACT scores.  Also note the 
statistically significant decline in resident students initially declaring a STEM major—a 
decline not seen in the nonresident group.  Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for 
those earning a degree at UNM during the study period.  Note there is less evidence of a 
compositional change in resident students, with only a small decline in high school GPA.  
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For degree earning residents, there is no descriptive evidence of a decline in STEM 
degree production after the initiation of the NMLLS. 
Although several statistically significant differences exist between resident and 
nonresident students in terms of high school GPA, composite ACT scores, remedial 
coursework, family income, race, and ethnicity, this does not threaten the validity of our 
difference-in-differences model of STEM engagement if the common trends assumption 
holds.  The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that pre-
treatment trends in the outcome variable be similar in trajectory across treatment and 
control groups.  As a visual check of this identifying assumption, Figure 4.1 presents pre-
treatment trends in the likelihood of declaring a first major in STEM for residents and 
nonresidents between 1994 and 1999.  Visual inspection supports the validity of a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy examining six-year graduation rates.  
Figure 4.2 presents pre-treatment trends in the likelihood of earning a STEM degree for 
residents and nonresidents over the same time period.  Because completion rates at UNM 
are relatively low, there are far fewer observations for this group and consequently the 
graph is quite noisy, especially for nonresidents who are greatly outnumbered by resident 
students at UNM (by nearly 11 times over).  Although Figure 4.1 seems reasonably 
comparable before the NMLLS was launched in 1997, Figure 4.2 does not pass visual 
inspection.  An empirical test of the common trends assumption is conducted following 
Autor (2003).  Autor suggests estimating flexible difference-in-differences models by 
interacting the resident dummy variable with cohort dummy variables, producing a model 
allowing for treatment at different time periods.  This model can be expressed as 
(3) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑀௜௦௧) = 𝛾௦ + 𝜆௧ + ∑ 𝛽௝௤௝ୀି௠ 𝐷௦௧(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) + 𝑋௜௦௧𝛿 + 𝜀௜௦௧ 
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where i denotes the student, s denotes residency status, and t denotes cohort year.  The 
variable Dst is the binary treatment indicator and k is the year which the treatment started 
(k = 1997 in this case).  Xist contains controls for race, ethnicity, gender, family income, 
remedial coursework in college, high school GPA, and standardized test scores.  Models 
report robust standard errors.  In equation (3), m and q are the number of leads and lags of 
the treatment effect included.  Two leads and three lags are included in the test, defining 
1999 as the reference cohort. 
Testing the common trends assumption using (3) requires examining whether 
(4) 𝛽௝ = 0 ∀𝑗 < 0. 
 In other words, the common trends assumption holds when the coefficients on all 
leads of the treatment are zero.  This specification can also have the advantage of 
informing whether estimated treatment effects occur in multiple post-treatment time 
periods, fade away with time, or remain constant, for example.  Tests are conducted for 
the two STEM outcomes using ordinary least squares and results are presented in 
Appendix A.  Results provide evidence that the common trends assumption holds for all 
specifications, as estimated coefficients on all leads are not statistically different from 
zero.   
 Data include 10,022 resident students, 6,307 of which enrolled during the post-
NMLLS period and were eligible for the Bridge to Success Scholarship.  Of these, 2,664 
met cumulative GPA and credit attainment requirements to begin the NMLLS in their 
second semester.  Table 4.4 documents the number of students that maintain the 
scholarship in the second through ninth semester.  It is apparent scholarship loss was 
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quite common.  Of the 2,664 students that qualified for the NMLLS, approximately 30 
percent were still eligible for the NMLLS going into their third year.   
4.5 Empirical model 
Difference-in-differences matching estimation on the propensity score is 
conducted to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresident 
students.  The approach uses kernel matching, a one-to-many matching technique 
assigning larger weights to control units closer in propensity score.  The general form of 
the matching estimator is given by 
(5)       ∆஽஽ொ=
1
𝑛ଵ௧
෍ ቐ𝑌ଵ௧௜ − ෍ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌଴௧௝
௝∈ூబ೟∩ௌ೛
ቑ
௜∈ூభ೟∩ௌ೛
−
1
𝑛ଵ௧ᇲ
෍ ቐ𝑌ଵ௧ᇲ௜ − ෍ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌଴௧ᇲ௝
௝∈ூబ೟ᇲ∩ௌ೛
ቑ
௜∈ூభ೟ᇲ∩ௌ೛
 
where n1t, n1t’ are the number of treated cases before and after the inception of the 
NMLLS, Sp is the common support region, and I0t, I0t’, I1t, I1t’ are the resident and 
nonresident groups before and after the NMLLS.  Major choice outcomes for resident and 
nonresident students are given by Y1t, Y0t, Y1t’, Y0t’.  The function w(i, j) denotes the 
weight given to j𝑡ℎ case, where ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)௝  = 1 and 0 < 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1.  The weighting 
function w(i, j) is given by 
(6)     𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾ൣ𝑙መ൫𝑥௝൯ − 𝑙መ(𝑥௜)൧
∑ 𝐾ൣ𝑙መ൫𝑥௝൯ − 𝑙መ(𝑥௜)൧௝∈ூబ೟∩ௌ೛
 
where K is the Epanechnikov kernel function and 𝑙መ(⋅) ≡ ln ቀ ௣ො(⋅)
ଵି௣ො(⋅)
ቁ is the fitted linearized 
propensity score from a logistic regression model estimated by maximum likelihood.  
Linearized propensity scores are used as they are more likely to have a distribution that is 
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approximately normal.  Treatment effects, ∆஽஽ொ, are calculated using kernel-weighted 
least squares according to equation (6).  Robust standard errors are reported.  The 
propensity score model includes all covariates in levels, as well as several quadratic 
terms.42  Results of the propensity score model are presented in Table 4.5.  It is important 
to note that while the propensity score model may seem awkward in that it predicts the 
immutable condition of being a New Mexico resident, it is not essential that the 
propensity score model have a meaningful interpretation.  Instead, the validity of the 
propensity score model rests on how well it balances covariates across treatment and 
control groups (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Imbens, 2015). 
Having a small group of nonresident students relative to resident students has 
implications for the estimates.  In order to increase the precision of estimated treatment 
effects, and to avoid imposing functional form where possible, kernel density matching is 
chosen.43  This method has the advantage of lower variance since more information is 
used.  On the other hand, it may result in an increase in bias due to the potential for 
considering “bad” matches.  Although the further the observations are in terms of 
propensity score, the less weight is given to the potential bad match, this makes adequate 
overlap a necessary condition for the validity of this method. 
In our analysis, matching is limited to those individuals whose propensity scores 
lie in the common support region, which is over 99.5 percent of the original sample.  No 
observations are trimmed from the analysis.  As a sensitivity analysis, effects are 
estimated using various fixed bandwidths, h, in the kernel function.  Importantly, the 
choice of bandwidth also involves a bias-variance trade-off.  Smaller bandwidths 
consider a smaller portion of the pool of control observations, and thus use less 
  102
information, which tends to reduce bias (from being less likely to consider poor matches) 
while increasing sampling variance.  In order to assess the effectiveness of the matching 
procedure, several tests are conducted following Imbens and Rubin (2015), although they 
are modified for difference-in-differences matching with repeated cross sections.  An 
explanation of these tests and their results are presented in the appendices to chapter 2. 
 In addition to estimating the overall effect of the NMLLS, I am also interested 
whether program effects differ depending on academic preparation.  This is explored by 
estimating separate models on students above and below the mean high school GPA.44  
Robustness checks using various STEM definitions, cohorts, and smoothing parameters 
are discussed in Section 6.1. 
While difference-in-differences models hinge on the comparability of pre-
treatment trends in outcomes across residents and nonresidents, combining difference-in-
differences methods with propensity score matching controls for compositional changes 
in groups over time (Stuart et al. 2014).  It is also worth noting that regressions control 
for high school achievement and standardized test scores, the main indication of 
compositional change.  Also, because UNM is a de facto open enrollment institution, 
changes in selectivity are not likely to confound the analysis (Binder and Ganderton, 
2004).  It is clear that compositional change in the student body occurred, yet this does 
not diminish the validity of treatment effects estimated. 
4.6 Results 
 Means and normalized differences after kernel matching are presented in Table 
4.6.  Comparing means before and after the NMLLS, it appears that the matching 
algorithm performed well in balancing covariates.  Normalized differences for pre- and 
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post-NMLLS periods are near zero, with the largest normalized difference (-.122) far 
below one-quarter of a standard deviation unit in absolute value.  These statistics are 
produced by academic preparation as well, revealing a similar pattern, although 
differences were slightly higher when considering students more than one standard 
deviation above the mean high school GPA.  Overall, normalized differences suggest 
excellent balance in covariates following kernel matching. 
 Table 4.7 presents results of the difference-in-differences kernel matching 
estimation.  Results provide no evidence of an overall effect on either first declaring a 
STEM major or earning a STEM degree.  Furthermore, there is no evidence suggesting 
the NMLLS had an impact on earned STEM degrees when the sample is disaggregated 
by academic preparation.  Considering students’ decisions to first declare a major in 
STEM, there appears to be a divergent effect: students with below average academic 
preparation are 6.8 percentage points (40 percent) less likely to declare their first major to 
be in a STEM field, while those with above-average academic preparation are 12.1 
percentage points (44.3 percent) more likely to declare a first major in STEM.  Effects 
are significant at ten and one percent-levels, respectively.  These divergent effects mask 
any overall program effect of the NMLLS on declaring a first major in STEM. 
In summary, results reveal no meaningful impact on first declaring a STEM major 
or earning a STEM degree in the aggregate.  In terms of declaring an initial major in 
STEM, I find that less-academically prepared students are averse to doing so.   
Conversely, I find that more-academically prepared students declare initial majors in 
STEM at higher rates compared to their nonresident counterparts as a result of the 
scholarship. 
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4.6.1  Alternative STEM definitions, smoothing parameters, and freshmen cohorts 
Robustness checks are conducted to examine the sensitivity of results to various 
assumptions.  Appendix 4.C offers three different definitions of STEM based on the 
student’s major.  Table 4.C1 presents STEM majors from the ACS, our preferred 
categorization scheme.  We prefer this set of STEM majors as it was developed by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, is sufficiently narrow in scope, and is the most comprehensive list 
that can be found.  Further, it is employed by previous literature which we are keen to 
compare our results to (Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a).  Tables 4.C2 and 4.C3 present 
alternative lists of STEM majors compiled by the STEM Collaborative Center (SCC) at 
UNM.  Table C2 presents the “broad” list of STEM majors compiled by SCC while 4.C3 
presents the “narrow” version.  The broad list is problematic because it includes many 
majors which one may not agree qualify as being designated as STEM, including 
anthropology, economics, geography, and nursing.  The narrow list should be a subset of 
the broad list put out by SCC, yet it is not.  For example, the narrow list includes statistics 
while the broad list does not.  I nonetheless run models of STEM major declaration and 
STEM degree completion using broad and narrow lists from SCC.  Appendix 4.D 
displays results of these regressions. 
Table 4.D1 presents estimates using the narrow STEM definition provided by the 
SCC.  Aggregate results and those disaggregated by academic preparation are shown.  In 
general, point estimates are similar to our preferred results using the ACS definition, but 
are attenuated in both magnitude and statistical significance.  Using the narrow definition, 
the point estimate for first majoring in STEM for less-academically prepared students 
remains negative, but is no longer precisely estimated.  The point estimate for first 
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majoring in STEM for more-academically prepared students is still positive, yet the 
magnitude is smaller and it achieves statistical significance at a lower level.  Table 4.D3 
is structured just as other results tables, but employs the broad list from SCC.  One would 
expect the broader scope of this definition to result in further attenuation in terms of 
magnitude and statistical significance, which it does with one exception.  Results using 
the broad definition estimate a large statistically significant decline in STEM major 
declaration for the most-academically prepared entering freshmen, although the point 
estimate is significant only at the ten percent-level. 
In addition to examining the sensitivity of results to various definitions of STEM, 
it is also imperative to examine whether results are sensitive to the choice of smoothing 
parameter used in the kernel matching procedure.  Appendix 4.E presents such sensitivity 
tests.  According to test performed in Appendix 4.B, the matching procedure performed 
remarkably well.  This is further evidenced by Table 4.E1 where one notes that only a 
few additional observations are included when increasing the bandwidth from 0.1 to 0.3.  
Point estimates using bandwidths of h = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} are remarkably close in 
magnitude and statistical significance.  There are no sign changes when varying the 
bandwidth across these values.  This provides evidence that bandwidth choice is not a 
significant driver of our main results presented in Table 4.7. 
Appendix 4.F presents results using different sets of freshmen cohorts.  Although 
a bit noisier than robustness checks using alternative bandwidths, we see a similar pattern 
of completion rates emerge as compared to our preferred specification.  Some 
coefficients become imprecisely estimated when including either the 1993 cohort, the 
2000 cohort, or both. 
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4.6.2  Compositional effects 
Key results from Section 6 are not entirely in agreement with the most thorough 
treatment of this subject to date.  Estimates in this paper reveal no meaningful effect of 
the NMLLS on the likelihood that students earn degrees in STEM fields, in contrast to 
Sjoquist and Winters (2015a).  However, results also provide no evidence that merit aid 
decreases students’ likelihoods of majoring in STEM, in agreement with Cornwell et al. 
(2006).  Further, estimates provide evidence of negative STEM degree effects for men, 
with no statistically meaningful effects for women in the sample, in-line with findings in 
Sjoquist and Winters (2015a).45  It is valuable to entertain compositional effects as an 
alternative hypothesis for the results obtained. 
The NMLLS was designed to increase access to higher education for resident 
students, which it certainly did.  According to Table 4.2, the post-NMLLS period of the 
sample showed a resident population increase of 70 percent (with a much smaller 11 
percent increase in nonresidents).  After the NMLLS was introduced, however, resident 
high school GPAs and standardized test scores fell significantly, and resident students 
were required to take more remedial courses at UNM.  This apparent change in student 
composition is likely key to interpreting much of the results found in Table 4.7.  
According to the theoretical model presented in Section 4.3, academically marginally 
prepared students are likely to respond to merit aid by choosing majors for which their 
probability of success is higher.  This may explain why results show that less-
academically prepared students majored in STEM significantly less in response to the 
NMLLS.  On the other hand, theory predicts that more-academically prepared students 
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have high probabilities of success in all majors, and so are likely to choose majors with 
higher expected lifetime earnings, such as STEM. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 I examine the effect of an exceptionally generous and low-bar merit-based 
scholarship on intitially declaring a major in STEM and ultimately earning a degree in 
STEM.  Variants of the difference-in-differences model are estimated using qualified 
resident students as the treatment group and a matched sample of ineligible nonresident 
students as the control group.  The common trends assumption is supported empirically.  
The sample is stratified by academic preparation and gender to see which, if any, 
subgroups are driving completion effects.  Kernel matching is conducted and its success 
is examined through rigorous statistical testing.  A flexible difference-in-differences 
model is estimated to verify that program effects are limited to treatment years.  
Sensitivity to cohorts included as well as the smoothing parameter used in the matching 
alogirthm are reported.  Additionally, I use alternative definitions of STEM, finding 
similar patterns in results that are attenauted in magnitude and significance-level. 
 Results reveal find no meaningful program effects in terms of declaring a STEM 
major or earning a STEM degree in the aggregate.  As per declaring an initial major in 
STEM, less-academically prepared students are more likely to declare a non-STEM 
major, an effect that appears to be driven by women.  Conversely, I find that more-
academically prepared students declare initial majors in STEM at higher rates compared 
to their nonresident counterparts as a result of the scholarship, an effect that is again 
driven by women at UNM.  These effects are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign, 
masking any program effect in the aggregate. 
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 In motivating the paper, two main research questions were proposed.  First, do 
generous, low-bar merit scholarships discourage students from choosing majors in 
STEM?  Results suggest the answer is “no” in the aggregate, but “yes” on behalf of less-
academically prepared students.  Moreover, such programs may actually increase interest 
in STEM majors on behalf of well-academically prepared students.  Second, do 
scholarships such as the NMLLS affect the number of STEM degrees produced?  The 
answer is a resounding “no” according to my results. 
 The main conclusion we can draw from the analysis is that low-bar merit-based 
scholarships neither increase nor decrease the production of STEM degrees.  I find little 
evidence that merit aid eligibility requirements result in students pursuing easier, non-
STEM course of study.  Although overall production of STEM degrees is not affected by 
such scholarships, they may alter the composition of who majors in STEM and who 
eventually completes a STEM degree.  To my knowledge, no other studies have looked at 
merit aid and STEM degree production by high- and low-achieving students.  We find a 
divergent effect of the NMLLS on major choice, in accordance with the theoretical model 
posed by Montmarquette et al. (2002): more-academically prepared students are more 
likely to declare a major in STEM, while less-academically prepared students are less 
likely to do so. 
 Since its inception in 1997, the NMLLS has seen significant changes.  Starting in 
the 2014-2015 academic year, the scholarship was capped at seven semesters (plus the 
initial bridging semester) and initial and renewal credit requirements were increased from 
12 to 15 credits earned per semester.  A statewide budget crisis in 2017 resulted in the 
legislature making major cuts to the NMLLS—whereas the scholarship paid 100 percent 
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of tuition over our study period, the program only covers approximately 60 percent of 
tuition as of the 2017-2018 academic year.  The 2017 Regular Session saw the passage of 
SB 420, which allows students to take a “gap” year after high school and still remain 
eligible for the NMLLS.  It is not clear how recent program changes will affect student 
choice of major at UNM.  
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Note:  The plot above show the likelihood of declaring the first major in STEM for 
incoming cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999.  Solid lines represent resident 
students while dashed lines represent nonresident students.  The vertical bars at 
1997 mark the implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship. 
Figure 4.1  Pre-post trends in the likelihood of declaring first major in STEM, by 
residency 
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Note:  The plot above show the likelihood of declaring the first major in STEM for 
incoming cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999.  Solid lines represent resident 
students while dashed lines represent nonresident students.  The vertical bars at 
1997 mark the implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship. 
Figure 4.2 Pre-post trends in the likelihood of earning a degree in STEM, by residency 
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Table 4.1 Full-time resident tuition at all NMLLS-eligible institutions 
 
  
Institution
Program Length 
(years)
Tuition 
and Fees
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 4 7,000     
University of New Mexico 4 6,950     
New Mexico State University 4 6,729     
Western New Mexico University 4 6,644     
Eastern New Mexico University 4 5,630     
New Mexico Highlands University 4 5,550     
New Mexico Military Institute 2 5,179     
Northern New Mexico College 4 5,112     
Mesalands Community College 2 1,990     
San Juan College 2 1,773     
Central New Mexico Community College 2 1,340     
Clovis Community College 2 1,324     
Santa Fe Community College 2 1,196     
New Mexico Junior College 2 1,158     
Luna Community College 2 968        
Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute 2 730        
Source:   Institution financial aid department websites.   Accessed 28 March 2017.  
Figures present tuition and fees for one academic year taking fifteen credit hours per 
semester.  For two-year schools it is assumed the student is within the community 
college district, where applicable.
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Table 4.2 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program, first 
major declared, ACS major codes 
 
 
Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels, 
respectively.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Variable Before After Diff. Before After Diff.
First Major Declared:
      STEM  .236 0.221 -.015*  .179 0.151 -0.026
      Liberal Arts 0.158 0.184  .026*** 0.206 0.237 0.031
      Education  .074 0.101  .027***  .061 0.088 .027*
      Business 0.075 0.094  .019*** 0.065 0.071 0.006
      Social Science  .110 0.101 -0.009  .112 0.122 0.01
      Health-Related 0.133 0.114 -.019*** 0.121 0.083 -.038**
      Never Declared 0.214 0.183 -.031*** 0.256 0.248 -0.008
HSGPA 3.312 3.273 -.038*** 3.233 3.3 .067**
-0.502 -0.471 -0.532 -0.503
ACT 22.53 22.176 -.354*** 22.317 22.861 .544**
-3.834 -3.887 -4.109 -4.096
Remedial 0.264 0.29 .026*** 0.164 0.227 .063***
Income < $40K 0.23 0.205 -.025*** 0.155 0.162 0.007
Female 0.571 0.565 -0.006 0.526 0.545 0.019
Hispanic 0.386 0.375 -0.011 0.147 0.166 0.02
Native 0.043 0.045 0.002 0.041 0.051 0.01
Asian 0.047 0.037 -.010** 0.034 0.026 -0.008
Black 0.021 0.022 0.002 0.082 0.08 -0.002
Observations 3,715 6,307 587 649
Residents Nonresidents
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Table 4.3 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program, 
degree type earned, ACS major codes 
 
 
Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels, 
respectively.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
Variable Before After Diff. Before After Diff.
Degree Type Earned:
      STEM  .253 0.24 -0.013  .173 0.195 0.022
      Liberal Arts 0.262 0.249 -0.013 0.341 0.326 -0.015
      Education  .116 0.081  -
.035***
 .121 0.026 -.095***
      Business 0.157 0.19  .033*** 0.185 0.163 -0.022
      Social Science  .167 0.177 0.01  .145 0.237 .092**
      Health-Related 0.044 0.064 .020*** 0.035 0.053 0.018
HSGPA 3.479 3.455 -.024* 3.483 3.473 -0.01
-0.467 -0.439 -0.46 -0.442
ACT 23.268 23.085 -0.183 23.526 23.807 0.281
-3.761 -3.784 -3.865 -3.888
Remedial 0.192 0.196 0.004 0.138 0.15 0.012
Income < $40K 0.194 0.173 -.021* 0.128 0.14 0.012
Female 0.616 0.616 0 0.622 0.609 -0.013
Hispanic 0.366 0.358 -0.008 0.097 0.159 .062*
Native 0.022 0.023 0.001 0.01 0.039 .029*
Asian 0.052 0.041 -.011* 0.041 0.019 -0.021
Black 0.016 0.018 0.002 0.102 0.058 -0.044
Observations 1,547 2,543 173 190
Residents Nonresidents
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Table 4.4 NMLLS student attrition, 1994-1999 
 
Semester Residents Eligible Percent Remaining 
2 
                          
2,664  100.0% 
3 
                          
2,249  84.4% 
4 
                          
2,017  75.7% 
5 
                          
1,863  69.9% 
6 
                          
1,734  65.1% 
7 
                          
1,629  61.1% 
8 
                          
1,568  58.9% 
9 
                          
1,510  56.7% 
Source: Office of Institutional Analytics, University of New 
Mexico.  We consider the sample of resident students that met 
cumulative GPA and credit requirements in their first semester to 
qualify for the NMLLS. 
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Table 4.5 Estimated parameters for propensity score model of NMLLS data, 1994-1999 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error 
   
HSGPA 1.729** .724 
ACT .498*** .090 
Remedial .891*** .118 
Income < 20K .268* .158 
Income < 40K .160 .108 
Female 1.670*** .367 
Hispanic 1.865*** .550 
Native American 1.884** .923 
Asian .032 .207 
Black -5.729*** 1.155 
Declined to state race-ethnicity -.108 .282 
ACT2 -.013*** .002 
ACT*Black .141*** .045 
Female*White -.571*** .146 
HSGPA2 -.461*** .116 
ACT*Female -.053*** .016 
ACT*HSGPA .059*** .020 
Remedial*Asian 1.147** .505 
GPA*Black .546 .339 
ACT*Native -.082** .041 
Female*Native -.608* .317 
HSGPA*Hispanic -.312* .165 
   
Constant -7.711*** 1.600 
   
Observations  11,258 
   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * correspond to 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  Propensity scores are estimated using a logistic 
model.  Forty-nine observations were dropped following estimation 
of the propensity score to ensure overlap, leaving 11,209 
observations. The variable Declined to state race-ethnicity is equal 
to one if the student declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 4.6:  Means and normalized differences after kernel matching, full sample, 1994-
1999 
 
 
 
Means are from Epanechnikov kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2.  
Normalized differences (ND) are calculated by taking the difference average covariate 
values by residency status and dividing by a measure of standard deviation. 
  
Variable Res. Nonres. ND Res. Nonres. ND
HS GPA 3.31 3.27 0.088 3.27 3.33 -0.122
Composite ACT 22.56 22.37 0.047 22.19 22.58 -0.099
Remedial 0.26 0.24 0.032 0.29 0.28 0.012
Income < $40,000 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.2 0.21 -0.032
Female 0.57 0.58 -0.009 0.56 0.59 -0.063
Hispanic 0.39 0.39 -0.019 0.37 0.36 0.025
Native 0.04 0.04 0.001 0.05 0.05 -0.03
Asian 0.04 0.03 0.058 0.04 0.03 0.019
Black 0.02 0.02 -0.023 0.02 0.02 0.018
Pre-NMLLS Post-NMLLS
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Table 4.7 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, American Community 
Survey definition, 1994-1999 
 
Group      Obs. First Declared STEM Obs. Majored in STEM 
     
Full Sample 11,209 .026 4,438 -.012 
  (.030)  (.057) 
     
     𝑌ത  .221  .240 
     
HSGPA ≤ 3.28 5,473 -.068* 1,507 .147 
  (.040)  (.093) 
     
     𝑌ത  .170  .145 
     
HSGPA > 3.28 5,734 .121*** 2,930 -.051 
  (.046)  (.073) 
     
     𝑌ത  .273  .291 
     
HSGPA > 3.78 2,105 -.063 1,271 -.061 
  (.067)  (.119) 
     
     𝑌ത  .334  .386 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using 
the Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation. 
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Notes  
32 See Sjoquist and Winters (2015a) for a complete list. 
33 The College Board, Trends in Student Aid 2015, Figure 28A and Figure 28B.  
Retrieved January 29, 2016 from http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/trends-
student-aid-web-final-508-2.pdf. 
34Georgia Student Finance Commission, GACollege411, Georgia Hope 
Scholarship Program Overview.  Retrieved May 29, 2013 from  
https://secure.gacollege411.org/Financial_Aid_Planning/HOPE_Program/Georgia_s_HO
PE_Scholarship_Program_Overview.aspx. 
35Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, Tennessee Hope Scholarship.  
Retrieved May 29, 2013 from 
http://www.tn.gov/collegepays/mon_college/hope_scholar.htm. 
36Florida Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Aid, Florida 
Student Scholarship and Grant Programs, Chart of Eligibility and Award Criteria.  
Retrieved May 29, 2013 from  
http://www.floridastudentfinancialaid.org/ssfad/PDF/BFEligibilityAwardChart.pdf. 
37Consider full-time tuition at all 16 participating public institutions in New 
Mexico as depicted in Table 4.1.  A student better matched at Santa Fe Community 
college may decide to attend UNM instead simply because the scholarship covers more 
costs, the degree carries more prestige, and thus the NMLLS is “worth” more at the 
state’s flagship university. 
38Sjoquist and Winters (2015a) calculate mean earnings for persons aged 40 – 49 
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using 2009 – 2011 ACS data, finding that those majoring in STEM fields earned $95,389; 
those with business degrees earned $78,122; those in social science earned $67,735; those 
with health-related degrees earned $58,937; those with liberal arts degrees earned 
$58,823; and those with degrees in education earned $46,169.  They choose this age 
range because 1) these respondents are too old to be affected by state merit aid programs 
and 2) according to Berger (1988) mid-career earnings are likely to be more relevant than 
early-career earnings.   
39 Majors are categorized into these bins according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
found online at https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/tech_docs/code_lists/2016_ACS_Code_Lists.pdf (accessed 19 Feb 2019). 
401995-1996 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report, U.S. Department of 
Education, online at https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-historical/pell-
eoy-1995-96.pdf (accessed 26 March 2017).  
41 King, Jacqueline E. “Missed Opportunities: Students who do not Apply for 
Financial Aid,” American Council on Education Issue Brief, 2004. Online at 
http://www.soe.vt.edu/highered/files/Perspectives_PolicyNews/10-04/2004FAFSA.pdf 
(accessed 1 April 2017). 
42A sequential search for quadratic terms to include in the propensity score model 
was conducted.  The first step involved estimating logistic models including all terms in 
levels and one of all possible quadratic terms.  I then calculate the likelihood ratio 
statistic for the null hypothesis that the most recently added quadratic term has a 
coefficient of zero.  The quadratic term with the highest test statistic over 2.71, 
corresponding to a z-statistic of 1.645, is selected for inclusion.  This covariate is then 
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added to the “baseline” model and the process repeated until all remaining likelihood 
ratio statistics are below the threshold of 2.71. 
43 There are 9,979 resident students and only 1,233 nonresident students in the 
sample.  One-to-many matching allows us to proceed without a significant loss in 
information.  For example, if I was to conduct a simple nearest neighbor matching 
procedure, estimates would (at most) be based on 1,233 matches, or 2,466 observations, 
which constitutes approximately 22 percent of the sample.   
44 Results are similar when the sample is split around the median high school 
GPA. 
45Although we estimate regressions splitting the sample by academic preparation 
and gender, we do not report these as the number of control units is problematically small 
when disaggregating the sample in this way. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions: How students respond to merit aid and how employers 
react to lengthened time to degree 
 
The work in this dissertation focuses on two major issues germane to the market 
for higher education:  the changing structure of financial aid in the United States and the 
changing paradigm of time to degree.  The advent of state merit-based scholarships in the 
U.S. has changed students’ college-going decisions, as well as their choices while in 
college.  While good intentions belie these programs, do such scholarships help or hinder 
a student’s ability to complete college?  Do they affect the academic trajectory of the 
student, ultimately affecting their career path?  Chapters 2 and 4 address this issue 
directly.  The longstanding trend of taking longer to complete a baccalaureate degree is 
also at question.  How long is too long?  Do employers entertain this variable when 
making job offers?  Chapter 3 addresses this issue.  I summarize the main findings, 
limitations, and policy implications of each essay in turn. 
In chapter two, “Does Broad-Based Merit Aid Improve College Completion? 
Evidence from New Mexico's Lottery Scholarship,” we investigate whether broad-based 
merit aid results in any meaningful change in college completion rates.  Surprisingly, we 
find that merit aid, as it is structured in New Mexico, results in some students being less 
likely to graduate, with others being more likely to graduate.  This divide hinges on 
academic preparation.  Although completion rates are unaffected in the aggregate, we 
provide evidence that such scholarships result in meaningful changes in student 
composition.  With low initial eligibility criteria, students appear to utilize the scholarship 
at the university providing the highest expected return on to degree, often corresponding 
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to the flagship university or the university with the highest cost of attendance.  Low-bar 
scholarships generous in funding may promote overmatching, which occurs when a 
student attends an institution for which they are academically underprepared.  We find 
that low-achieving high school students that acquire such scholarships are less likely to 
complete their studies.  Conversely, students that perform well in high school are more 
likely to complete.  What is the best solution to increasing access to higher education at 
the state-level?  Not surprising to economists, it appears that broad-based merit-aid 
scholarships have both costs and benefits to recipients.  The trade-off focuses is one 
between access and completion: broad-based merit scholarships significantly increase 
access to higher education, yet they distort the choice of where to go, and may harm the 
marginally prepared student seeking out the highest return.  Disaggregating results by 
family income suggests that program effects are likely driven by students from low-
income households.  Because the NMLLS has had many difficulties regarding solvency 
over the years, we recommend that a need-based component to the scholarship be 
considered.  Additionally, researchers would like to have data on the entire postsecondary 
system in New Mexico, which would allow for a richer analysis of compositional change 
as a result of such scholarships. 
In chapter three, “Wage Effects of Baccalaureate Time to Degree in the United 
States,” we examine whether how long an undergraduate student spends obtaining a 
degree matters to employers after college.  Using a nationally-representative longitudinal 
study of high school students, we develop a test of whether longer time to degree serves 
as a negative productivity signal.  Previous literature estimates that each additional year 
beyond the four-year mark results in up to an eight percent wage penalty.  Being skeptics, 
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and assuming that college students are rational actors in the economy, we test this 
hypothesis ourselves.  The major problem with previous literature is that time to degree is 
endogenous in the earnings equation.  That is, there are several factors which may both 
affect time to degree and earnings, such as student ability, college quality, for example, 
and unobservable factors that impact how long a student typically graduates at a given 
college.  We confront this endogeneity by controlling for student ability (vis-à-vis 
standardized test scores), institution quality (vis-à-vis Barron’s Admissions 
Competitiveness data), and instrumenting the student’s time to degree by the average at 
their institution.  The instrument appears to be relevant and exogenous.  Without using 
instrumental variables techniques, we are able to mimic the large and significant wage 
penalties found in previous studies.  However, after controlling for the above and using 
instrumental variables, results suggest that time to degree is not taken as a productivity 
signal, and there is no wage penalty associated with lengthened time to degree.  Results 
provide fodder to arguments that punishing prolonged time to degree is a waste of 
resources.  Indeed, we offer theoretical and empirical evidence showing that rational, 
utility-maximizing students may prefer to earn a degree and work part-time 
simultaneously over six years, rather than foregoing work and completing a degree in 
four years.  
In chapter four, “Merit Aid Scholarships and Human Capital Production in 
STEM: Evidence from New Mexico,” I examine whether merit based aid dissuades 
students from studying more difficult subjects, such as STEM.  The advent of state merit 
aid scholarships begs the question: do students respond by avoiding more difficult 
majors, such as those in STEM?  I again utilize the rich administrative data set provided 
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by UNM (same as chapter two).  Using the same matching algorithm, which appears to 
have been successful, I estimate whether students are more- or less-STEM averse after 
receiving the scholarship.  Using two different outcomes related to studying STEM 
(declaring a first major in STEM and earning a degree in STEM), I find that there is no 
meaningful impact of the NMLLS in the aggregate.  However, there does appear to be a 
divergent effect when disaggregating by academic preparation, as proxied by one’s high 
school performance.   High achieving students seem to study more STEM in response to 
merit aid, while low-achieving student have an opposite reaction.  This is in line with the 
theoretical literature.  Results suggest that adopting or killing state merit aid scholarships 
will not affect degree production in STEM, although it may change the composition of 
those earning it in terms of academic preparation and gender. 
This work is by no means a comprehensive study relating to the relationship 
between state merit aid student outcomes.  In fact, it only scratches the surface.  We 
provide evidence of the costs and benefits of such aid, but implore universities and state 
governments to make more data available, so that we may make more informed decisions 
regarding the trade-off between accessibility to higher education and student success. 
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Appendices to Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.A Assessing properties of the propensity score 
 
In order to examine the effectiveness of our matching procedure, we first assess 
overlap in the propensity score both before and after the NMLLS is in place.  Note that 
tests conducted in this section use only information concerning covariates and residency 
classification, and do not consider completion rates, therefore cannot intentionally 
introduce bias in subsequent analyses.  For a thorough treatment of these tests, see 
Imbens and Rubin (2015). 
Figure 2.A1 presents histogram estimates of the distribution of linearized 
propensity scores before and after the implementation of the NMLLS, by residency.  First 
inspection reveals substantial overlap in the linearized propensity score across residents 
and nonresidents, both before and after the NMLLS was launched.  As a more formal 
check, we calculate the percent of observations where there exists an observation of the 
opposite treatment status with a difference in linearized propensity score less than 10 
percent.  These measures are presented in Table 2.A1.  For residents, approximately 99 
percent of students had at least one closely matching nonresident student in terms of 
linearized propensity score both before and after the launch of the NMLLS.  For 
nonresidents, this percentage was approximately 97 percent.  This suggests we should be 
able to credibly estimate causal effects of the NMLLS on student graduation under the 
assumption of unconfoundedness. 
We next perform two tests assessing the balancing property of the propensity 
score, which asserts that conditional on the propensity score, treatment assignment and 
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student characteristics are independent of one another.  We perform these tests both 
before and after the NMLLS is launched.  If results of these tests are favorable, this 
constitutes evidence supporting the assumption of unconfoundedness, although it cannot 
be directly tested.  The balancing property can be formally represented as:  
𝑊௜  ⫫  𝑋௜ | 𝑙(𝑋௜)         (2. 𝐴1) 
where Wi is a binary treatment indicator equal to one if student i is a New Mexico 
resident, and zero otherwise, Xi is a vector of covariates, and l(Xi) is the true linearized 
propensity score.  Because we do not know the true linearized propensity score, we 
approximate this test by instead using its estimated counterpart, 𝑙መ(𝑋௜).  Our strategy is to 
stratify the sample into J blocks, 𝐵௜(1), … , 𝐵௜(𝐽), so there will be no significant 
difference between linearized propensity scores within each block.  This way, (2.A1) 
becomes 
𝑊௜  ⫫  𝑋௜ | 𝐵௜(1), … , 𝐵௜(𝐽).          (2. 𝐴2) 
Equation (2.A2) can be examined by testing whether residency classification and 
covariates are uncorrelated within each of the J blocks, so that 
𝐸[𝑋௜|𝑊௜ = 1, 𝐵௜(𝑗) = 1] = 𝐸[𝑋௜|𝑊௜ = 0, 𝐵௜(𝑗) = 1]          (2. 𝐴3) 
for all blocks, j = 1, …, J.  Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 present the results of this stratification 
procedure.  For the pre-NMLLS period, we split the sample into 11 blocks using the 
linearized propensity score.  Near the upper end of the propensity score distribution, we 
were not able to further split blocks 10 and 11 due to a small number of nonresident 
students relative to the number of resident students.46  We also encountered this issue 
when stratifying the sample in the post-NMLLS period, although at the opposite end of 
the propensity score distribution.  We nonetheless consider the stratification successful, 
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as only two of the 25 blocks created were left with propensity scores that were 
significantly different across resident and nonresident groups at the five percent level. 
With pre- and post-NMLLS samples stratified, we then assess covariate balance 
within blocks.  These tests can be thought of “pseudo treatment effects” as they examine 
the effect of treatment on pre-treatment covariates, where the effects are a priori known 
to be zero.  Confirmation that pseudo treatment effects are zero constitutes evidence that 
equation (2.A3) holds, supporting the assumption of unconfoundedness.  We conduct two 
different tests.  First, we test separately, by each covariate, whether within-block 
differences between residents and nonresidents are equal to zero.  Second, for each 
covariate we test whether the weighted average of within-block differences between 
residents and nonresidents are equal to zero.  Results of these tests for pre- and post-
NMLLS cohorts are reported in Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5, respectively.  
We analyze the results of these tests as if data arose from a stratified random 
experiment.  The first approach for assessing covariate balance focuses on one covariate-
block dyad at a time.  We calculate z-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference between residents and nonresidents in the dyad is equal to zero.  These tests 
produce a large amount of information, however they are not very informative when 
examined individually.  Of the 113 pre-NMLLS tests, only seven (six percent) had z-
statistics above two.  Similarly, of the 148 post-NMLLS tests, only twelve (eight percent) 
exceeded two in absolute value.  It is informative to present these statistics in Q-Q plots, 
where z-values are compared against their expected values under independent draws from 
a standard normal distribution.  If the distributions of z-values closely follow the 45 
degree lines in these plots, it is evidence that the propensity score was effective in 
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balancing covariates as if treatment was randomly assigned within blocks.  Q-Q plots are 
presented in Figures 2.A2 and 2.A3.  Both appear to follow the normal distribution 
reasonably well, although they are slightly skewed to the right (especially for pre-
treatment cohorts).  One major outlier deserves attention in Figure 2.A2—it is due to the 
incomparability of black resident and nonresident students at UNM at a particular region 
of the propensity score distribution.47 
The column labeled as the overall t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
block-adjusted weighted average of within block differences is equal to zero.  Finding z-
values larger in absolute value than we would expect if they were drawn independently 
from a standard normal distribution is evidence that the stratification does not adequately 
balance covariates, suggesting that the propensity score model is not satisfactory and may 
need to be refined.  According to Table 2.A4, there do not appear to be any significant 
balance issues for pre-NMLLS cohorts.  For these cohorts, the largest t-statistic we find is 
1.73, suggesting excellent balance.  Table 2.A5 reveals that there may exist some 
imbalance in the high school GPA and ACT composite score covariates for post-NMLLS 
cohorts.  The z-statistics for these covariates are 2.17 and 2.14 in absolute value, 
respectively, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the weighted averages 
of within-block differences are zero for both of these variables at the five percent level.  
Analyzing normalized differences between residents and nonresidents for these 
covariates after matching is performed provides an additional check as to whether this 
imbalance requires estimating a more flexible propensity score or perhaps trimming the 
sample.  Although the propensity score model did not perform as well as would 
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randomization into treatment within blocks, overall we feel it worked adequately in 
balancing covariates across resident and nonresident students. 
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Note:  The left and right panels overlap linearized propensity scores for 
residents and nonresidents before and after the implementation of the NMLLS, 
respectively, allowing for visual inspection of sufficient overlap, a critical 
requirement for successful propensity score matching. Both figures indicate 
there is sufficient overlap of residents and nonresidents. 
Figure 2.A1 Linearized propensity scores, by residency and NMLLS implementation 
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Note:  The left panel presents a normal Q-Q plot of t-statistics from within-block tests 
before implementation of the NMLLS.  Normal Q-Q plots graph actual percentiles 
against theoretical percentages from a normal distribution with the same mean and 
standard deviation.  Normality is evidenced by a straight line of plotted values.  Above 
right is a histogram of the same t-statistics with a fitted normal curve.  Both plots provide 
visual evidence of slight positive skew. 
 
Figure 2.A2 Visual check of normality of within-block differences across resident status, 
pre-NMLLS 
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Note:  The left panel presents a normal Q-Q plot of t-statistics from within-block tests 
after implementation of the NMLLS.  Normal Q-Q plots graph actual percentiles against 
theoretical percentages from a normal distribution with the same mean and standard 
deviation.  Normality is evidenced by a straight line of plotted values.  Above right is a 
histogram of the same t-statistics with a fitted normal curve.  Again, both plots provide 
visual evidence of slight positive skew. 
Figure 2.A3 Visual check of normality of within-block differences across resident status, 
post-NMLLS 
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Table 2.A1 Proportion of units with match discrepancy in terms of linearized propensity 
score less than 10 percent 
 
Measure  Pre-NMLLS  Post-NMLLS 
     
qnonresident  .971  .968 
        
qresident  .989  .995 
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Table 2.A2 Propensity score blocks and their boundaries, pre-NMLLS 
Block Lower Upper Width Nonresidents Residents t-Statistic 
       
1 .238 .688 .449 37 29 -.854 
       
2 .688 .757 .070 24 43 -.796 
       
3 .757 .800 .043 47 86 -.598 
       
4 .800 .830 .030 57 209 -.057 
       
5 .830 .843 .013 47 219 .054 
       
6 .843 .851 .009 62 205 .154 
       
7 .851 .888 .036 167 899 .783 
       
8 .888 .920 .032 62 471 .304 
       
9 .920 .945 .025 38 496 .065 
       
10 .945 .961 .015 23 510 -3.274 
       
11 .961 .985 .024 21 513 -1.519 
            
Above presents results of an attempt to stratify the sample on the linearized 
propensity score.  t-statistics are for the null hypothesis of equality in linearized 
propensity scores between resident and nonresident students.  Blocks 10 and 11 
could not be split further as there would be an insufficient number of members in 
new groups for subsequent hypothesis testing. 
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Table 2.A3.  Propensity score blocks and their boundaries, post-NMLLS 
Block Lower Upper Width Nonresidents Residents t-Statistic 
       
1 .249 .717 .468 40 68 -3.393 
       
2 .717 .780 .063 25 83 -1.314 
       
3 .780 .813 .033 28 188 -1.493 
       
4 .813 .832 .019 49 383 -.835 
       
5 .832 .852 .020 110 758 .419 
       
6 .852 .869 .017 109 755 -.516 
       
7 .869 .888 .020 89 779 -.557 
       
8 .889 .896 .007 36 180 -.292 
       
9 .896 .904 .008 18 199 -.877 
       
10 .904 .922 .017 26 407 -.971 
       
11 .922 .937 .015 31 402 .328 
       
12 .937 .946 .010 22 411 -1.339 
       
13 .946 .962 .015 45 821 -.569 
       
14 .962 .987 .025 20 846 -.390 
            
Above presents results of an attempt to stratify the sample on the linearized 
propensity score.  t-statistics are for the null hypothesis of equality in linearized 
propensity scores between resident and nonresident students.  Block 1 could not 
be split further as there would be an insufficient number of members in new 
groups for subsequent hypothesis testing. 
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Table 2.A4 Tests for balance conditional on propensity score, pre-NMLLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Covariate   Within Blocks   Overall 
                              
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11   t-Statistic 
High School 
GPA   0.37 -0.37 -1.81 -2.21 1.51 -0.15 -0.74 -1.27 -0.78 -0.03 -0.22   1.73 
Composite ACT   -0.94 -2.31 -1.58 -1.82 -0.75 -0.60 0.09 -1.35 -0.56 2.25 0.09   0.85 
Remedial   -2.43 0.22 -0.85 0.67 1.46 -0.40 0.01 0.45 -0.97 -0.92 -0.83   0.83 
Income < 20K   0.27 -0.76 -0.07 0.99 1.20 0.59 -0.83 -1.04 -0.36 0.40 0.35   0.59 
Income < 40K   0.19 -0.85 -0.85 -0.90 -0.45 1.46 -0.47 0.88 -0.97 -1.08 0.29   1.17 
Female   -0.83 -1.07 0.05 -0.42 0.58 -0.90 0.50 -1.91 1.69 -0.74 0.16   0.27 
Hispanic   -1.13 1.35 -0.74 1.92 - -0.78 -0.08 0.73 -0.58 0.12 1.31   -0.76 
Native   - -0.74 -1.69 -0.54 2.76 -0.07 -0.39 -0.33 0.01 0.53 -   -0.10 
Asian   0.88 1.35 -0.07 1.93 -0.93 0.08 -0.02 -1.23 2.64 -0.64 -1.31   -0.03 
Black   -1.41 -0.63 -1.29 -0.90 0.36 -0.55 0.54 5.08 -0.55 - -   -1.08 
Declined   - 1.35 -0.74 -0.91 -0.46 - -1.30 0.11 -0.48 -0.21 -   1.22 
                              
                              
z-statistics test the null hypothesis of equality of means within blocks for resident and nonresident students.  Overall t-
statistics test the null hypothesis that the weighted average of differences across blocks is equal to zero.  Declined is 
equal to zero if the student declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2.A5:  Tests for balance conditional on propensity score, post-NMLLS 
 
 
 
 
  
Covariate Overall
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 t-Statistic
High School GPA -1.88 -2.38 -1.76 1.49 1.56 2.07 1.20 -0.19 0.67 0.94 1.50 0.82 0.51 0.06 -2.17
Composite ACT -2.24 -0.63 0.42 2.35 1.90 -0.88 2.44 0.34 1.85 0.53 -0.56 0.57 -0.15 0.54 -2.14
Remedial 2.79 1.45 -0.43 0.25 0.11 1.23 -1.97 0.74 -2.25 -0.99 1.63 -1.03 1.46 -0.80 0.28
Income < 20K -0.11 -0.38 -0.87 1.45 0.13 1.24 -0.54 0.17 0.66 -0.11 -1.06 0.22 -0.61 0.66 -0.33
Income < 40K 1.28 -0.16 -1.25 0.35 -0.85 0.62 -0.14 -0.91 2.95 -0.87 -0.87 -0.15 -1.69 2.09 -0.69
Female -0.96 -0.82 -0.08 1.34 0.06 1.97 -0.07 -0.27 -1.02 0.75 0.84 1.25 -0.58 0.10 -1.14
Hispanic -0.77 -0.55 -0.67 -0.36 0.74 -0.85 0.45 -1.52 -0.44 0.53 -1.04 -0.64 -1.19 0.38 0.86
Native - -0.17 -0.49 -0.50 -0.35 0.69 -1.12 2.04 -0.16 0.16 0.83 0.46 0.19 -0.15 -0.45
Asian - -0.55 1.57 1.04 -0.85 -1.58 -0.33 -0.25 0.20 -0.32 0.74 1.53 1.55 -0.36 -0.06
Black 1.47 0.55 -0.58 -0.95 0.70 0.30 0.35 -0.78 -0.52 -0.72 -0.39 -0.57 - - 0.38
Declined - 2.66 -0.96 -0.88 0.29 0.43 1.24 -1.01 0.10 2.83 -0.84 -0.57 -0.41 - -1.23
Within Blocks
z-statistics test the null hypothesis of equality of means within blocks for resident and nonresident students.  Overall t-statistics test 
the null hypothesis that the weighted average of differences across blocks is equal to zero.  Declined is equal to zero if the student 
declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise.
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Notes
46 In order to perform subsequent hypothesis testing, we are not able to further 
split blocks where new blocks would have fewer members than K + 2, where K is the 
number of covariates. 
47 Although this outlier is visually striking, it is driven by the relatively small 
number of black students at UNM (less than 3 percent of the sample). 
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Appendix 2.B  Alternative bandwidths 
 
 
Table 2.B1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of .1, .2, and .3; 1994-
1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   h = 0.1 11,207 -.035 -.027 -.020 -.013 
   h = 0.2 11,209 -.035 -.030 -.024 -.019 
   h = 0.3 11,210 -.035 -.030 -.024 -.019 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   h = 0.1 5,470 -.014 -.037 .064 -.082* 
   h = 0.2 5,473 -.015 -.035 -.069* -.087** 
   h = 0.3 5,474 -.016 -.034 -.070* -.089** 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   h = 0.1 5,732 -.026 .016 .066 .089* 
   h = 0.2 5,734 -.022 .016 .069 .094* 
   h = 0.3 5,735 -.023 .013 .067 .096* 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   h = 0.1 2,103 .041 .095 .098 .113 
   h = 0.2 2,105 .031 .082 .093 .107 
   h = 0.3 2,105 .034 .086 .103 .115 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function 
with various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78). 
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Table 2.B2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3; 
family income < $40,000; 1994-1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   h = 0.1 2,291 -.010 -.014 -.041 -.016 
   h = 0.2 2,296 -.011 -.012 -.037 -.020 
   h = 0.3 2,297 -.013 -.015 -.040 -.025 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   h = 0.1 1,128 .003 -.013 -.206** -.204** 
   h = 0.2 1,131 .003 -.018 -.197** -.202** 
   h = 0.3 1,133 .004 -.019 -.183* -.198** 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   h = 0.1 1,160 .047 .054 .180* .226* 
   h = 0.2 1,162 .022 .037 .161 .200* 
   h = 0.3 1,163 .017 .033 .156 .205* 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   h = 0.1 403 -.086 -.036 .148 .054 
   h = 0.2 404 -.091 -.032 .151 .054 
   h = 0.3 404 -.071 -.012 .159 .060 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function 
with various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78). 
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Table 2.B3 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3; 
family income ≥ $40,000; 1994-1999 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   h = 0.1 8,904 -.037 -.028 -.018 -.011 
   h = 0.2 8,908 -.035 -.028 -.015 -.010 
   h = 0.3 8,909 -.035 -.027 -.012 -.008 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   h = 0.1 4,333 -.014 -.038 -.042 -.061 
   h = 0.2 4,335 -.018 -.040 -.035 -.055 
   h = 0.3 4,336 -.019 -.038 -.030 -.052 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   h = 0.1 4,569 -.030 .014 .029 .049 
   h = 0.2 4,571 -.027 .011 .033 .058 
   h = 0.3 4,571 -.032 .005 .030 .056 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   h = 0.1 1,699 .052 .110 .089 .123 
   h = 0.2 1,701 .055 .109 .096 .130 
   h = 0.3 1,701 .055 .109 .106 .139* 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with 
various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below average 
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and 
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Appendix 2.C  Alternative sets of cohorts  
 
 
Table 2.C1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   1993 – 1999 12,755 -.022 -.011 .010 .024 
   1993 – 2000 15,208 -.037* -.032 -.002 .018 
   1994 – 1999 11,209 -.035 -.030 -.024 -.019 
   1994 – 2000 13,715 -.047** -.047* -.030 -.015 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 6,309 -.015 -.027 -.031 -.033 
   1993 – 2000 7,510 -.012 -.041 -.045 -.038 
   1994 – 1999 5,473 -.015 -.035 -.069* -.087** 
   1994 – 2000 6,706 -.016 -.052** -.076** -.084** 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 6,441 -.011 .024 .082* .107** 
   1993 – 2000 7,696 -.038 .003 .067 .096** 
   1994 – 1999 5,734 -.022 .016 .069 .094* 
   1994 – 2000 7,009 -.046 -.003 .063 .098** 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   1993 – 1999 2,359 -.004 .080 .117 .103 
   1993 – 2000 2,838 -.061 .018 .084 .080 
   1994 – 1999 2,105 .031 .082 .093 .107 
   1994 – 2000 2,583 -.019 -.031 .073 .094 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with 
various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below average 
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and 
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Table 2.C2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets, family 
income < $40,000 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   1993 – 1999 2,611 .045 .053 .062 .047 
   1993 – 2000 3,009 .008 -.016 -.001 .005 
   1994 – 1999 2,296 -.011 -.012 -.037 -.020 
   1994 – 2000 2,749 -.052 -.078* -.094 -.074 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 1,291 .007 .012 -.105 -.131 
   1993 – 2000 1,505 .002 -.045 -.145* -.145* 
   1994 – 1999 1,131 .003 -.018 -.197** -.202** 
   1994 – 2000 1,379 -.002 -.053 -.190*** -.171** 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 1,318 .116 .127 .269*** .229* 
   1993 – 2000 1,503 .003 .008 .150 .173 
   1994 – 1999 1,162 .022 .037 .161 .200* 
   1994 – 2000 1,369 -.083 -.069 .061 .097 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   1993 – 1999 456 -.031 -.0002 .199 -.114 
   1993 – 2000 518 -.160 -.129 .145 .049 
   1994 – 1999 404 -.091 -.032 .151 .054 
   1994 – 2000 467 -.178 -.102 .174 .124 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with 
various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below average 
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and 
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Table 2.C3 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets, family 
income ≥ $40,000 
 
  Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 4 Years 4 ½ Years 5 Years 6 Years 
      
Full Sample      
   1993 – 1999 10,140 -.030 -.019 .005 .022 
   1993 – 2000 12,195 -.046* -.036 -.004 .017 
   1994 – 1999 8,908 -.035 -.028 -.015 -.010 
   1994 – 2000 10,955 -.048* -.042 -.014 -.001 
      
GPA ≤ 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 5,015 -.020 -.039 -.014 -.010 
   1993 – 2000 6,001 -.016 -.046 -.022 -.011 
   1994 – 1999 4,335 -.018 -.040 -.035 -.055 
   1994 – 2000 5,316 -.017 -.049 -.026 -.038 
      
GPA > 3.28      
   1993 – 1999 5,121 -.017 .024 .055 .078* 
   1993 – 2000 6,192 -.044 .006 .050 .075 
   1994 – 1999 4,571 -.027 .011 .033 .058 
   1994 – 2000 5,639 -.043 .002 .045 .075 
      
GPA > 3.78      
   1993 – 1999 1,902 -.0001 .102 .113 .141* 
   1993 – 2000 2,320 -.042 .052 .083 .101 
   1994 – 1999 1,701 .055 .109 .096 .130 
   1994 – 2000 2,116 -.012 .041 .059 .100 
      
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with 
various bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with below average 
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and 
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Appendix 2.D  Accumulation of credits models 
 
Table 2.D1 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-in-
differences kernel matching, 1994-1999 
 
  Cumulative Credits by Year Since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
Full Sample 11,209 -.374 -.633 .094 .359 1.160 1.903 
  (.755) (1.673) (2.610) (3.443) (3.899) (4.098) 
        
     𝑌ത  21.834 40.315 56.372 71.446 81.615 86.387 
        
GPA ≤ 3.28 5,473 -1.480 -3.361 -3.453 -5.793 -7.465 -7.693 
  (1.016) (2.279) (3.611) (4.586) (5.291) (5.591) 
        
     𝑌ത  19.040 33.752 46.131 57.592 66.780 57.591 
        
GPA > 3.28 5,734 1.777** 4.123* 6.757** 10.809** 13.957*** 15.355*** 
  (.902) (2.104) (3.268) (4.517) (5.172) (5.395) 
        
     𝑌ത  24.679 46.700 66.804 88.558 96.748 101.866 
        
GPA > 3.78 2,105 -.594 1.099 5.319 10.470 12.735 14.802* 
  (1.199) (3.128) (5.289) (7.472) 
 
(8.310) 
 
(8.557) 
 
     𝑌ത  27.376 53.024 76.187 98.428 109.629 114.472 
       
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from difference-
in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below average or 
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high 
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).  𝑌ത denotes 
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first 
enrollment for resident students.  
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Table 2.D2 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-in-
differences kernel matching, family income < $40,000, 1994-1999 
 
 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from difference-
in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below average or 
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high 
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).  𝑌ത denotes 
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first 
enrollment for resident students.  
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Table 2.D3 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-in-
differences kernel matching, family income ≥ $40,000, 1994-1999 
 
 Cumulative Credits by Year Since First Enrollment 
Group      Obs. 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
        
Full Sample 8,908 -.301 -.980 -.523 -.227 .831 1.697 
  (.795) (1.848) (2.853) (3.846) (4.344) (34.532) 
        
     𝑌ത  22.107 40.872 57.210 72.559 82.778 87.382 
        
GPA ≤ 3.28 4,335 -.848 -3.147 -2.789 -5.251 -6.2137 -6.337 
  (1.168) (2.596) (4.022) (5.250) (6.009) (6.377) 
        
     𝑌ത  19.290 34.235 46.831 58.612 62.083 72.437 
        
GPA > 3.28 4,571 .860 1.810 2.973 6.085 8.551 10.097* 
  (.880) (2.169) (3.414) (4.774) (5.428) (5.630) 
        
     𝑌ത  24.979 47.641 67.793 86.781 97.964 102.623 
        
GPA > 3.78 1,701 -.395 1.913 6.943 12.085 14.463 16.734* 
  (1.311) (3.311) (5.510) (7.756) 
 
(8.659) 
 
(8.976) 
 
     𝑌ത  27.613 53.793 77.568 100.236 111.264 115.802 
        
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from difference-
in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the 
Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below average or 
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high 
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).  𝑌ത denotes 
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first 
enrollment for resident students.  
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.A Mathematical derivations 
 
 
Recall 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑌ு and 𝑌஼ are earnings with a high school diploma and a 
baccalaureate degree, respectively, and 𝐹 is direct full-time schooling costs per year.  
Students prefer a six-year, .75 FTE (i.e., 30 hour per week) employment approach to 
traditional baccalaureate degree attainment (i.e., .25 FTE, four-year path) when 
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To simplify this expression, we pull out constant terms from the summation operators, 
combine like terms, and apply the rule of finite geometric series which states that 
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giving the following equation: 
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Removing summation notation for the second and third terms allows the expression to be 
reduced to: 
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Simplifying the second term and adding it to both sides produces: 
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Moving all the discount rate parameters to the left-hand side and simplifying yields the 
solution in equation (2): 
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Appendix 3.B U.S. News & World Report Classification 
 
Table 3.B1 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings, by institution type, 2005 
 
 
Top 50 Public Schools Top 65 Private Schools Top 50 Liberal Arts Schools
University of California–Berkeley Harvard University Amherst College
University of Virginia Princeton University Williams College
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor Yale University Swarthmore College
University of California–Los Angeles University of Pennsylvania Wellesley College
University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Duke University Carleton College
College of William and Mary MIT Middlebury College
University of Wisconsin–Madison Stanford University Pomona College
University of California–San Diego California Institute of Tech. Bowdoin College
University of Illinois Columbia University Davidson College
Georgia Institute of Technology Dartmouth College Haverford College
University of California–Davis Northwestern University Claremont-McKenna
University of California–Irvine Washington Univ. of St. Louis Wesleyan University
University of California–Santa Barbara Brown University Grinnell College
University of Texas–Austin Cornell University Vassar College
University of Washington Johns Hopkins University Harvey Mudd College
Pennsylvania State University University of Chicago Washington and Lee
University of Florida Rice University Smith College
University of Maryland–College Park Notre Dame University Hamilton College
Rutgers University–New Brunswick Vanderbilt University Colgate University
University of Georgia Emory University Oberlin College
University of Iowa Carnegie Mellon University Colby College
Miami University (Ohio) Georgetown University Bates College
Ohio State University Wake Forest University Bryn Mawr College
Purdue University Tufts University Colorado College
Texas A&M–College Station Univ. of Southern California Macalester College
University of Connecticut Brandeis University Scripps College
University of Delaware New York University Mt. Holyoke College
University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Case Western Reserve Barnard College
Indiana University Lehigh University Kenyon College
Michigan State University Univ. of Rochester College of the Holy Cross
Clemson University Tulane University Trinity College
Highly Selective Private Schools
Note:  Adopted from Bound et al. (2012) and the 2005 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings.  
Highly selective private colleges also include the four U.S. Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military 
Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air 
Force Academy.  
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Table 3.B1 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings, by Institution Type, 2005 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Top 50 Public Schools Top 65 Private Schools Top 50 Liberal Arts Schools
SUNY at Binghamton Rensselaer Polytechnic Lafayette College
University of California–Santa Cruz Yeshiva University Occidental College
University of Colorado–Boulder George Washington Univ. Bard College
Virginia Tech. Pepperdine University Furman University
University of California–Riverside Syracuse University Whitman College
Iowa State University Worcester Polytechnic Union College
North Carolina State University Boston University Franklin and Marshall
University of Alabama University of Miami Sewanee College
University of Missouri–Columbia Fordham University University of Richmond
Auburn University Southern Methodist Univ. Connecticut College
University of Kansas Brigham Young University Centre College
University of Tennessee–Knoxville Clark University Dickinson College
University of Vermont Stevens Inst. of Technology Skidmore College
Ohio University St. Louis University Gettysburg College
University of Arizona Baylor University Pitzer College
University of Massachusetts–Amherst American University DePauw University
University of Nebraska–Lincoln Howard University Rhodes College
University of New Hampshire Marquette University Reed College
University of Denver
University of Tulsa
Texas Christian University
University of Dayton
Drexel University
Illinois Institute of Technology
University of San Diego
Catholic University
Loyola University
Univ. of San Francisco
University of the Pacific
New School
Northeastern University
Seton Hall University
University of St. Thomas
Note:  Adopted from Bound et al. (2012) and the 2005 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings.  
Highly selective private colleges also include the four U.S. Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military 
Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air 
Force Academy.  
Highly Selective Private Schools
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.A Flexible difference-in-differences results 
 
Table 4.A1 Common trends assumption test, American Community Survey definition, 
1994-1999 
 
Leads/Lags  First Declared Degree Earned 
    
    
    
NMLLS t-3  .026        .064 
  (.037) (.075) 
    
NMLLS t-2  -.052 -.018 
  (.040) (.081) 
    
NMLLS t-1  -.058 .050 
  (.042) (.073) 
    
NMLLS t0  .026 -.003 
  (.037) (.074) 
    
NMLLS t+1  .009 .070 
  (.036) (.070) 
    
R2  .0609 .1249 
    
Prob > F  .464 .666 
    
Observations  11,258 4,453 
    
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Ordinary least 
squares estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 
1999 given.  Reported coefficients are on interactions between 
cohort years and a resident dummy variable.  Models include 
resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for race, 
ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and 
family income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was 
implemented.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. NMLLSt+2 (1999) serves 
as the base year.  Prob > F displays the p-value of the null 
hypothesis that estimated coefficients on leading periods are 
jointly different from zero. 
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Appendix 4.B.  Categorizing of STEM majors 
 
 
Table 4.B1 Majors classified as STEM according to the American Community Survey 
 
ACS Code ACS Code Description 
 
2402 Biological engineering   
2403 Architectural engineering   
2404 Biomedical engineering   
2405 Chemical engineering   
2406 Civil engineering   
2407 Computer engineering   
2408 Electrical engineering   
2409 Engineering mechanics, physics, and science   
2410 Environmental engineering   
2411 Geological and geophysical engineering   
2412 Industrial and manufacturing engineering   
2413 Materials engineering and materials science   
2414 Mechanical engineering   
2415 Metallurgical engineering   
2416 Mining and mineral engineering   
2417 Naval architecture and marine engineering   
2418 Nuclear engineering   
2419 Petroleum engineering   
2499 Miscellaneous engineering   
2500 Engineering technologies   
2501 Engineering and industrial management   
2502 Electrical engineering technology   
2503 Industrial production technologies   
2504 Mechanical engineering related technologies   
2599 Miscellaneous engineering technologies   
3600 Biology   
3601 Biochemical sciences   
3602 Botany   
3603 Molecular biology   
3604 Ecology   
3605 Genetics   
3606 Microbiology   
3607 Pharmacology   
3608 Physiology   
3609 Zoology   
3611 Neuroscience   
3699 Miscellaneous biology   
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Table 4.B1 (continued) 
 
ACS Code ACS Code Description 
  
3700 Mathematics 
3701 Applied mathematics 
3702 Statistics and decision science 
3801 Military technologies 
4002 Nutrition sciences 
4003 Neuroscience 
4005 Mathematics and computer science 
4006 Cognitive science and biopsychology 
5000 Physical sciences 
5001 Astronomy and astrophysics 
5002 Atmospheric sciences and meteorology 
5003 Chemistry 
5004 Geology and earth science 
5005 Geosciences 
5006 Oceanography 
5007 Physics 
5008 Materials science 
5098 Multi-disciplinary or general science 
5102 Nuclear, industrial radiology, and biological technologies 
5901 Transportation sciences and technologies 
6106 Health and medical preparatory programs 
6108 Pharmacy, pharmaceutical sciences, and administration 
6202 Actuarial science 
6212 Miscellaneous information systems and statistics 
  
The code list from the American Community Survey was referenced 22 Jan 
2018 and can be found online at 
https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/tech_docs/code_lists/2016_AC
S_Code_Lists.pdf.  See Sjoquist and Winters (2015a) for a more exhaustive list 
that categorizes majors into other categories including liberal arts, health-
related, social sciences, education, and business. 
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Table 4.B2 Majors classified as STEM according to the STEM Collaborative Center at 
the University of New Mexico, Broad Definition 
 
Major Code(s) Major Description 
 
5, ANTH Anthropology  
6, ARCH Architecture  
249, BIOC Biochemistry  
12, BIOL Biology  
15, CHE Chemical Engineering  
16, CHEM Chemistry  
17, CE Civil Engineering  
171, CPE Computer Engineering  
109, 168, ACS, CS Computer Science  
262, CONE Construction Engineering  
263, 474, CMGT, CONM Construction Management  
22, 23, DEHY, DHYG Dental Hygiene  
340, EPS Earth and Planetary Sciences  
27, ECON Economics  
173, EE Electrical Engineering  
379, EMS Emergency Medical Services  
438, ENSC Environmental Science  
371, GENG General Engineering  
46, GEOG Geography  
481, HMHV Health, Medicine and Human Values  
INGV Integrative Studies  
110 Management Information Systems  
64, MATH Mathematics  
65, ME Mechanical Engineering  
353, MEDL Medical Laboratory Sciences  
76, NE Nuclear Engineering  
77, 456, NUR, NURS Nursing  
24, NDIT Nutrition/Dietetics  
81, PHYC Physics  
405, PAP Physics and Astrophysics  
FANT Pre Anthropology  
FBIC Pre Biochemistry  
FBIO Pre Biology  
FCH Pre Chemical Engineering  
FCHM Pre Chemistry  
FCE Pre Civil Engineering  
FCP Pre Computer Engineering  
FCS Pre Computer Science  
FEPS Pre Earth and Planetary Sciences  
FECO Pre Economics  
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Table 4.B2 (continued) 
 
Major Code(s) Major Description 
  
FEE Pre Electrical Engineering 
FESC Pre Environmental Science 
  
The code list was provided by the Office of Institutional Analytics at the University of New 
Mexico.  STEM-designated majors are according to the University of New Mexico STEM 
Collaborative Center and can be found online at https://stem.unm.edu/tools-for-faculty-and-
staff/5517-broad-data.pdf (accessed 24 Jan 2018).  This is considered the “broad” list of STEM 
majors at the University of New Mexico. 
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Table 4.B3 Majors classified as STEM according to the STEM Collaborative Center at 
the University of New Mexico, Narrow Definition 
 
Major Code(s) Major Description 
 
249, BIOC Biochemistry   
12, BIOL Biology   
15, CHE Chemical Engineering   
16, CHEM Chemistry   
17, CE Civil Engineering   
171, CPE Computer Engineering   
109, 168, ACS, CS Computer Science   
262, CONE Construction Engineering   
263, 474, CMGT, CONM Construction Management   
340, EPS Earth and Planetary Sciences   
173, EE Electrical Engineering   
438, ENSC Environmental Science   
371, GENG General Engineering   
64, MATH Mathematics   
65, ME Mechanical Engineering   
76, NE Nuclear Engineering   
81, PHYC Physics   
405, PAP Physics and Astrophysics   
FANT Pre Anthropology   
FBIC Pre Biochemistry   
FBIO Pre Biology   
FCH Pre Chemical Engineering   
FCHM Pre Chemistry   
FCE Pre Civil Engineering   
FCP Pre Computer Engineering   
FCS Pre Computer Science   
FCOE Pre Construction Engineering   
FCON Pre Construction Management   
FEPS Pre Earth and Planetary Science   
FEE Pre Electrical Engineering   
FESC Pre Environmental Science   
FMAT Pre Mathematics   
FME Pre Mechanical Engineering   
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Table 4.B3 (continued) 
 
FNE Pre Nuclear Engineering   
FPHY Pre Physics   
FSTA Pre Statistics   
STAT Statistics   
    
The code list was provided by the University of New Mexico.  STEM-designated majors 
are according to the University of New Mexico STEM Collaborative Center and can be 
found online at https://stem.unm.edu/common/pdfs/17-benchmarking-narrow.pdf 
(accessed 5 Feb 2018).  This is considered the “narrow” list of STEM majors at the 
University of New Mexico. 
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Appendix 4.C Alternative STEM definitions 
 
 
Table 4.C1 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, UNM narrow STEM 
definition, 1994-1999 
 
Group      Obs. First Declared STEM Obs. Majored in STEM 
     
Full Sample 11,209 .022 4,692 .009 
  (.029)  (.052) 
     
     𝑌ത  .197  .194 
     
HSGPA ≤ 3.28 5,473 -.022 1,574 .121 
  (.031)  (.086) 
     
     𝑌ത  .153  .110 
     
HSGPA > 3.28 5,734 .084* 3,117 -.011 
  (.045)  (.068) 
     
     𝑌ത  .312  .238 
     
HSGPA > 3.78 2,105 -.099 1,357 -.094 
  (.063)  (.099) 
     
     𝑌ത  .299  .332 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using 
the Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation. 
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Table 4.C2 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, UNM broad STEM 
definition, 1994-1999 
 
Group      Obs. First Declared STEM Obs. Majored in STEM 
     
Full Sample 11,209 .025 4,692 -.033 
  (.033)  (.057) 
     
     𝑌ത  .264  .276 
     
HSGPA ≤ 3.28 5,473 -.009 1,574 .065 
  (.041)  (.096) 
     
     𝑌ത  .217  .187 
     
HSGPA > 3.28 5,734 .079* 3,117 -.054 
  (.047)  (.072) 
     
     𝑌ത  .312  .323 
     
HSGPA > 3.78 2,105 -.126* 1,357 -.112 
  (.067)  (.103) 
     
     𝑌ത  .364  .400 
     
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using 
the Epanechnikov kernel function.  We report estimates for students with below 
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 
3.78).  𝑌ത denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation. 
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Appendix 4.D Alternative bandwidths 
 
 
Table 4.D1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3; 
1994-1999 
 
 STEM First Declared 
Group Obs. Estimate 
   
Full Sample   
   h = 0.1 11,207 .025 
   h = 0.2 11,209 .026 
   h = 0.3 11,210 .027 
   
GPA ≤ 3.28   
   h = 0.1 5,470 -.063* 
   h = 0.2 5,473 -.068* 
   h = 0.3 5,474 -.057 
   
GPA > 3.28   
   h = 0.1 5,732 .115** 
   h = 0.2 5,734 .121*** 
   h = 0.3 5,735 .119*** 
   
GPA > 3.78   
   h = 0.1 2,103 -.088 
   h = 0.2 2,105 -.063 
   h = 0.3 2,105 -.049 
   
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, 
respectively.  Estimates are from difference-in-differences kernel 
matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with various 
bandwidth parameters, h.  We report estimates for students with 
below average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average 
high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one 
standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Table 4.D2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3; 
1994-1999 
 
 STEM Degree Earned 
Group Obs. Estimate 
   
Full Sample   
   h = 0.1 4,437 -.024 
   h = 0.2 4,438 -.012 
   h = 0.3 4,439 -.016 
   
GPA ≤ 3.28   
   h = 0.1 1,506 .156* 
   h = 0.2 1,507 .147 
   h = 0.3 1,508 .134 
   
GPA > 3.28   
   h = 0.1 2,929 -.045 
   h = 0.2 2,930 -.051 
   h = 0.3 2,930 -.065 
   
GPA > 3.78   
   h = 0.1 1,271 -.028 
   h = 0.2 1,271 -.061 
   h = 0.3 1,271 -.118 
   
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  
Estimates are from difference-in-differences kernel matching using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with various bandwidth parameters, h.  We 
report estimates for students with below average or average high school 
GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high school 
GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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Appendix 4.E Alternative cohorts 
 
 
Table 4.E1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets 
 
 First Declared STEM Major 
Group Obs. Estimate 
   
Full Sample   
   1993 – 1999 12,788 .027 
   1993 – 2000 15,308 .013 
   1994 – 1999 11,209 .026 
   1994 – 2000 13,756 .012 
   
GPA ≤ 3.28   
   1993 – 1999 6,335 -.036 
   1993 – 2000 7,564 -.072 
   1994 – 1999 5,473 -.068* 
   1994 – 2000 6,725 -.097** 
   
GPA > 3.28   
   1993 – 1999 6,451 .091** 
   1993 – 2000 7,742 .079** 
   1994 – 1999 5,734 .121*** 
   1994 – 2000 7,029 .112** 
   
GPA > 3.78   
   1993 – 1999 2,364 -.025 
   1993 – 2000 2,860 -.018 
   1994 – 1999 2,105 -.063 
   1994 – 2000 2,601 -.054 
   
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates are from 
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with various freshmen 
cohorts included.  We report estimates for students 
with below average or average high school GPAs (≤ 
3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and 
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation 
above the mean (> 3.78). 
  
  164
Table 4.E2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets 
 
 Earned STEM Degree 
Group Obs. Estimate 
   
Full Sample   
   1993 – 1999 4,932 -.024 
   1993 – 2000 5,953 .001 
   1994 – 1999 4,438 -.012 
   1994 – 2000 5,466 .002 
   
GPA ≤ 3.28   
   1993 – 1999 1,712 .165* 
   1993 – 2000 2,037 .165** 
   1994 – 1999 1,507 .147 
   1994 – 2000 1,836 .155* 
   
GPA > 3.28   
   1993 – 1999 3,219 -.068 
   1993 – 2000 3,915 -.040 
   1994 – 1999 2,930 -.051 
   1994 – 2000 3,629 -.034 
   
GPA > 3.78   
   1993 – 1999 1,400 -.104 
   1993 – 2000 1,711 -.083 
   1994 – 1999 1,271 -.061 
   1994 – 2000 1,581 -.062 
   
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.  Estimates 
are from difference-in-differences kernel matching 
using an Epanechnikov kernel function with various 
freshmen cohorts included.  We report estimates for 
students with below average or average high school 
GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one 
standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 
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